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IX. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Federal Nexus in Electronic Surveillance
In the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968' (the Act),
Congress attempted to protect the privacy of all oral and wire communica-
tions by delineating the condition and circumstances under which these
communications could be intercepted.2 The Act purportedly prohibits any
person3 from intercepting wire [wiretapping]4 or oral [bugging]5 commu-
nications without first securing the consent of a participant in the conver-
sation.6 In United States v. Burroughs,7 the Fourth Circuit examined the
application of the federal anti-bugging statute to the activity of private
individuals. The court decided that individuals could not be convicted of
bugging under the Act absent proof of a federal nexus.'
Two management employees of J. P. Stevens & Co. were charged under
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1976) for bugging the conversations of union organ-
izers attempting to unionize the employees of the J. P. Stevens plant in
strictly complies with the procedure and notice requirements of the statute. See United States
v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); United States v.
Bailey, 537 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975);
note 8 supra.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
2 Id. at § 2516. Section 2516 deals with procedures for utilization of electronic surveil-
lance by law enforcement officials. The principal goal of these surveillance standards is to
comply with the constititutional requirements set out by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (New York eavesdropping statute unconstitutional) and Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (government's eavesdropping activity constituted a
"search and seizure" within meaning of fourth amendment). S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2161-62 [hereinafter cited
as SENATE REPORT].
"Person" is defined for purposes of the Act's electronic surveillance provisions to in-
clude "any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision
thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corpora-
tion. . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1976) contains a blanket prohibition against the unauthorized
interception of any wire communication. To convict a person of wiretapping under §
2511(1)(a), the government must prove that the communication was sent through the facili-
ties of a communications common carrier. United States v. Blattel, 340 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D.
Iowa 1972); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1976). A communications common carrier is defined as any
person engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)
(1976). Because wiretapping by definition requires interference with facilities which are part
of interstate commerce, Congress may prohibit wiretapping under the commerce clause.
Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 327 (1939); see SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2180.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1976). Section 2510(2) defines "oral communication" as any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such an expectation. Section
2511(1)(b)(i)-(iv) prohibits the interception of oral communication where the bugging affects
interstate commerce.
' See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1976).




Wallace, South Carolina.' The defendants allegedly bugged a telephone in
the union organizers' motel room in order to eavesdrop on the conversa-
tions taking place in that room." Since the government had failed to prove
that the attempted bugging involved state action or action under color of
state or federal law, the district court acquittdd the defendants notwith-
standing a jury verdict of guilty." Although the bugging statute does not
specifically require state or federal action, 2 the court reasoned that since
the statute does not require that the bugging affect interstate commerce,
it is constitutional only if construed to apply to governmental action and
not to private action. 3
On appeal," the government challenged the district court's determina-
tion that the bugging statute requires proof that the persons charged were
acting under color of state or federal law, 5 arguing that the statute was
' Id. at 1113. The defendants were originally indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(1)
(1976), for intercepting oral communications through the use of a device used in interstate
wire communications. 564 F.2d at 1113. This indictment was dismissed because the telephone
line was not tapped to permit the interception of the organizers' telephone conversations. Id.
10 Id.
1, United States v. Burroughs, 379 F. Supp. 736, 742-43 (D.S.C. 1974). A motion for
judgment of acquittal is granted notwithstanding a verdict of guilty if the court determines
that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. FED. R. Cm. P. 29; see United States
v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
22 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1976); see note 5 supra.
3 379 F. Supp. at 741 (reasoning that broad bugging prohibition of the Act constitutional
only if enacted with reference to an expressly granted federal power). The district court
emphasized that § 2511(1)(b)(i)-(iv) prohibits private bugging activity which affects inter-
state commerce. Id. If the broad bugging prohibition of § 2511(1)(a) could also be applied to
private action, there would be no need to rely on the commerce power to reach private activity
since § 2511(1)(a) would prohibit all bugging and render redundant § 2511(1)(b). Id. The
court concluded that the broad bugging prohibition of § 2511(1)(a) applies only to governmen-
tal action, emphasizing that Congress would not enact redundant legislation. Id. The district
court recognized that under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, Congress could prohibit
the interception of oral communications by those acting under color of state or federal law.
Id.; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53
(1967); note 2 supra. See generally Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Congress may
enforce equal protection clause by prohibiting enforcement of state law). The district court
in Burroughs emphasized Congress' concern that the application of § 2511(1)(a) to private
bugging might lead to a constitutional challenge which could be avoided by specifying an
alternative constitutional basis for the prohibition. 379 F. Supp. at 741; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 2180. The district court concluded that § 2511(1)(b)(i)-(iv) provided an alternative
basis under the commerce clause for prohibiting private bugging and that, therefore, §
2511(1)(a) did not apply to private bugging. 379 F. Supp. at 741-42.
24 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the government's first appeal, concluding that such an
appeal would violate the double jeopardy clause. 564 F.2d at 1116; see United States v.
Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970); U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourth Circuit reinstated the govern-
ment's appeal relying upon United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975). 564 F.2d at 1116.
The Wilson court held that the government may appeal from an adverse judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. Such an appeal does not violate the double jeopardy clause because
restoration of the guilty verdict rather than a new trial will result if the government prevails.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 353 (1975); 564 F.2d at 1117. See United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
Is 564 F.2d at 1113; see note 14 supra.
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intended to reach all unauthorized electronic surveillance and was not
limited to action under color of law."6 The government also asserted that
Congress had determined that private bugging affects interstate commerce
when it enacted the anti-bugging statute17 and that such a finding gave
Congress a sufficient federal nexus to legislate which would be imputed to
all violations of the anti-bugging statute.' 8 Thus, the government argued
that proof of a federal nexus was not required in each prosecution under
the statute.'9
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's acquittal of the defen-
dants, but concluded that the broad anti-bugging provision of the Act
could be applied to persons other than those acting under color of state or
federal law since Congress had not placed any express limitations on the
statute's application.2' The court noted that the Act contains anti-bugging
provisions which specifically require the government to prove an effect
" Brief for Appellant at 18, United States v. Burroughs, 564 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. The government contended that the langugage of
§ 2511(1)(a) was unambiguous, and that if Congress had intended § 2511(1)(a) to apply only
to persons acting under color of law, it would have stated so explicitly. See Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966). The government also relied
on the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976) to support its position that'§ 2511(1)(a)
also applied to private bugging. Brief for Appellant, supra at 21. *The Senate Judiciary
Committee's statement of the prohibition contained in § 2511 emphasized that there was
little justification for unauthorized electronic surveillance by private parties, and that privacy
could be adequately protected only by dealing with all aspects of the problem through com-
prehensive national legislation. SENATE REPor, supra note 2, at 2156.
" Brief for Appellant, note 16 supra, at 21. The government asserted that Congress had
determined that in light of the finding that the possession, manufacture, distribution, adver-
tising, and use of electronic surveillance devices are facilitated by interstate commerce,
intrastate bugging activity affected interstate commerce. Id. Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968); Brown, Electronic
Eavesdropping, published in, Hearings on the Right of Privacy Act of 1967 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 73 (1967).
"' 564 F.2d at 1115; see note 17 supra. The government argued that all activities which
affect commerce may be regulated by Congress. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16 at 22; see
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See generally Stern, The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy, 1933-46, 59 Hv. L. REv. 645 (1946). The commerce
power has been used as a national police power since 1918. See, e.g., United States v. Sulli-
van, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913); W. LocKHART, Y.
KAMISAR, J. CHOPER, CONsTrruriONAL LAw 320 (3d ed. 1970). In addition to the connection that
electronic surveillance devices have with commerce, see note 17 supra, the government noted
that Congress had been concerned over the widespread "use and abuse" of electronic surveil-
lance in commercial and employer-labor espionage. Brief for Appellant, note 16 supra, at 22;
SENATE REPoRT, supra note 2, at 2154.
"1 564 F.2d at 1115; Brief for Appellant, note 16 supra, at 19-20; see Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1970) (rational Congressional determination that intrastate loan
sharking may be regulated under commerce clause alleviates federal nexus requirement in
individual cases); McClellan, Codification, Reform and Revision: The Challenge of a Modem
Federal Criminal Code, 1971 DUKE L.J. 663, 685.
564 F.2d at 1115-16.
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upon interstate commerce. 2' The court, however, refused to declare the
broad anti-bugging statute unconstitutional simply because it did not
specify a particular basis for federal jurisdiction over bugging activity.22
The court concluded that proof of "any rational basis" for federal jurisdic-
tion over the defendants' conduct would be sufficient to bring them within
the ambit of the statute.? Since the government had failed to allege a
possible basis for federal jurisdiction,2 4 the Fourth Circuit held that the
defendants were properly acquitted.?
Burroughs is the first case in which a circuit court has considered con-
stitutional challenges to the broad anti-bugging provision of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.2 6 In concluding that the statute ap-
plies to bugging by private parties,2 the Fourth Circuit relied on a literal
interpretation of the language of the statute. Since the Act prohibits "any
person" from wiretapping or bugging,2 the court reasoned that restricting
the term "person" to those acting under color of law would be improper.21
The Fourth Circuit also relied on the legislative history of the Act to
support its position that the statute prohibits all bugging activity and,
therefore, overlaps with those provisions which prohibit bugging affecting
interstate commerce."0 Although Congress did not elaborate on the issue
21 Id. at 1115; 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(i)-(iv) (1976).
= 564 F.2d at 1115.
2 Id. The Fourth Circuit relied on Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 n.1 (1971),
see note 20 supra, for the proposition that Congress can prohibit private bugging only if it
has a rational basis for exercising federal jurisdiction over the activity. 564 F.2d at 1115;
accord, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 247 (1964).
2 379 F. Supp. at 744. The government may have been able to establish an effect on
interstate commerce in several ways. First, the bugging took place on the premises of a motel
which affected commerce by providing lodging to interstate travelers. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Second, since J. P. Stevens was engaged
in interstate commerce, the success or failure of the union organizers' activities probably
would have an impact on interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Third, an effect on
interstate commerce could have been established by proof that the bugged telephone was used
in interstate commerce. 379 F. Supp. at 744; see United States v. Blattel, 340 F. Supp. 1140
(N.D. Iowa 1972). See generally United States v. Bennett, 358 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
r, 564 F.2d at 1116; see note 12 supra. The government has the burden of proving every
essential element of the offense charged. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89 (1949);
L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULEs § 26:67 (1966).
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1976).
564 F.2d at 1115.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1976).
22 564 F.2d at 1115. The Fourth Circuit noted that the district court's construction of the
eavesdropping statute would give two different meanings to the term "person" used in § 2511
and defined in § 2510(6) to include "any individual." 564 F.2d at 1115 n.6; see note 3 supra.
Under the district court's construction, the term "person" would encompass the entire defini-
tion if wiretapping was charged, but would only apply to persons acting under color of law if
bugging was charged. 564 F.2d at 1115 n.6.
11 564 F.2d at 1114-15; see note 23 supra. The Fourth Circuit emphasized the statement
in the Senate Judiciary Committee's analysis of the Act that the broad prohibition of §
2511(1)(a) is applicable to bugging. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2180. Since the applica-
tion of § 2511(1)(a) had not been expressly limited to actions under color of law, the
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of private bugging, the Congressional hearings clearly indicate an intent
to prohibit this type of activity.'
By requiring the government to establish at trial a "rational basis" for
federal jurisdiction over the alleged bugging activity, the Fourth Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of the statute without ruling on the jurisdic-
tional basis for its enactment. The Burroughs decision suggests that this
jurisdictional basis may be found in the commerce clause since the
"rational basis" test has been used by courts to determine the constitution-
ality of federal regulation over local activity under the commerce clause.2
Congress may regulate local activity if there is a rational basis for the belief
that the activity affects interstate commerce. 3 In Burroughs, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that since Congress had not clearly stated its jurisdic-
tional basis for enacting the broad prohibition on bugging, the govern-
ment must establish this basis at trial.3 4 The court emphasized that this
requirement would only allow federal intrusions on traditional state crimi-
nal jurisdiction"35 where a federal interest is involved."
Burroughs court concluded that Congress intended § 2511(1)(a) to overlap with § 2511(1)(b).
Thus, § 2511(1)(a) could prohibit private bugging in cases that § 2511(1)(b) would not reach.
564 F.2d at 1114-15.
11 See notes 17 & 19 supra. The minimal attention given to private eavesdropping activity
in the legislative history of the Act has been interpreted differently in the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits. In Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974),
the Fifth Circuit held that the wiretapping prohibition of § 2511 did not apply to private
interspousal wiretapping because Congress did not specifically discuss this type of activity.
490 F.2d at 807-09. In United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976), the Sixth Circuit
held that there was no interspousal exception to the wiretapping prohibition of § 2511. 542
F.2d at 673. The Jones court reasoned that Congress had not focused on private electronic
surveillance because of the consensus that there was "no justification" for such activity. Id.
at 671. See Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 TOL. L. REv. 185,
203 (1975). The position that § 2511 applies to private activity, espoused by the Fifth Circuit
in Jones and the Fourth Circuit in Burroughs, is supported by United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505 (1974), in which the Court stated that "[t]he purpose of the legislation ...
was effectively to prohibit . . . all interceptions of oral and wire communications, except
those specifically provided for in the Act,. . ." 416 U.S. at 514.
2 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
11 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see text accompanying note 23 supra.
564 F.2d at 1115, citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 351 (1971).
564 F.2d at 1116. Eavesdropping is proscribed as a felony in South Carolina. S.C. CODE
§ 16-17-470 (1976); cf. People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 522 P.2d 1049, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241,
appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1064 (1974) (state wiretap provisions do not conflict with federal
law).
Is 564 F.2d at 1115. The Burroughs court emphasized that the federal nexus requirement
would preserve the federal-state balance in the area of criminal law. Id. Since few of the
federal government's enumerated powers relate specifically to criminal law enforcement, but
see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10; art. I, § 3, Congress has been reluctant to define
conduct, which is already denounced as criminal by the states, as a federal crime. United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1241 (1958). Congress has repeatedly used
the commerce clause as a national police power to extend federal criminal jurisdiction. See
Chamberlain, Federal Criminal Statutes, 20 A.B.A.J. 501 (1934); Note, The Scope of Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 805 (1972). By requiring
[Vol. XXXVI
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The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Burroughs did not specify what type
of proof is needed to establish a federal nexus.37 Nevertheless, the use of
the rational basis test .to determine the constitutionality of federal legisla-
tion under the commerce clause suggests that proof that the bugging af-
fects interstate commerce will provide the required nexus." Although the
Burroughs court did not state explicitly how strong the federal nexus must
be to bring private bugging within the ambit of the statute, 9 the court
indicated that proof of a remote effect on interstate commerce may be
adequate."0
The Fourth Circuit holding in Burroughs emphasized that bugging by
a private party will only be treated as a federal offense when the govern-
ment establishes some basis for federal jurisdiction over that party's activ-
ity.41 Although this federal nexus may be established under the commerce
clause, 2 the court's failure to specify Congress' jurisdictional basis for
enacting the broad anti-bugging statutes suggests that the nexus may also
be found elsewhere in the Constitution.43 Therefore, the degree to which
the statute will be used to reach private intrastate bugging will depend on
the construction given to the federal nexus requirement. If courts require
.merely a remote federal nexus, the Burroughs decision may result in an
increase rather than a decrease in federal criminal jurisdiction.
MARK C. RUSSELL
proof of a federal nexus, however, the Burroughs court adopted the view that this power may
be used only to further federal interests. See 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention,
131, quoted in, Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation, 18 MINN.
L. REv. 759, 759-60. (1934).
u The legislative history of the Act suggests that the federal nexus may be found in the
power of Congress to protect the right of privacy from private interference under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2180; see
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). The fourth and fifth amendments also guarantee
a citizen's right of privacy against unreasonable governmental invasions. See, e.g., Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See notes 23-24 supra.
564 F.2d at 1115. United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1970), affl'd, 402 U.S.
146 (1971), relied on by the Burroughs court, has been criticized for its failure to guide courts
in determining whether there is a rational connection between local activity and interstate
commerce. See Comment, The Eleventh Amendment Yields, 21 CATH. U. L. Rav. 163 (1971);
Comment, Federal Regulation of Local Activity: The Demise of the Rational Basis Test, 1972
L. & Soc. ORDER 683 (1972). The Second Circuit in Perez equivocated on the standard
required to establish a rational basis for federal jurisdiction, discussing first a "substantial
impact" on commerce, 526 F.2d at 1078, and later merely a "tenuous impact." Id. at 1080.
The Supreme Court in Perez did not clarify the Second Circuit's discussion of the amount of
tie-in necessary. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
1' 564 F.2d at 1115. In the recent case of United States v. Scarborough, 539 F.2d 331 (4th
Cir. 1976), affl'd, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), the Fourth Circuit held that a remote connection with
interstate commerce is sufficient to establish a federal nexus under 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)
(1968). 539 F.2d at 332; see Comment, Interstate Nexus Requirement Defined For Firearm
Possession by Felons, 29 MERcER L. REV. 867 (1978).
' 564 F.2d at 1115.
" See text accompanying note 38 supra; notes 23-24 supra.
See note 37 supra.
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B. Juvenile Waiver of Miranda Rights
The privilege against self-incrimination' is an integral part of the Amer-
ican adversarial system of criminal justice.2 In Miranda v. Arizona,' the
Supreme Court broadly defined the protection of the self-incrimination
privilege by requiring police officers to advise a suspect, prior to custodial
interrogation, of his constitutional rights.4 Although these rights subse-
quently may be waived, the Miranda Court emphasized that a waiver must
be knowingly and intelligently made5 and it placed a heavy burden on the
state in demonstrating such a waiver.' Many factors are considered in
determining whether an accused has made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his Miranda rights.7 Courts must be especially careful when
The fifth amendment provides that: "[n]o person shall . . .be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . . "U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-45 (1897). Traditionally, the benefits of
the fifth amendment were available only in the federal court system. See Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1908). The Supreme Court later rejected this position, however,
finding the privilege against self-incrimination applicable in state proceedings. See Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964); Reavley, Self-Incrimination: Rights Reconstituted, 39 TEx.
B.J. 389, 390 (1976).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1 Id. at 444. The Miranda court held that, prior to questioning, law enforcement officers
must advise a suspect of his right to remain silent and that anything said could be used
against him in court. Furthermore, officers are required to inform the suspect of his constitu-
tional right to consult with and have an attorney present during questioning. The officers
must also inform the suspect that if he desires and cannot afford a lawyer, one will be
appointed for him. Id. at 467-73.
1 Id. at 475.
6 Id. The Miranda majority stressed that the Court had set high standards of proof for
the state in showing that an accused had waived a constitutional right. Id.; see Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (courts should indulge in every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental rights); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (though
constitutional rights may be waived, courts must examine an accused's background, experi-
ence, and conduct in determining whether a waiver is intelligently made). Miranda did not
require an express, affirmative waiver, holding that an express statement by the suspect that
he is willing to talk and does not wish to see an attorney, followed closely by a confession,
could constitute a waiver. 384 U.S. at 475. Nevertheless, Miranda cautioned against presum-
ing a valid waiver simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or from
the fact that a confession subsequently is obtained. Id.; see Note, The Declining Miranda
Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Development of Miranda Issues, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 259
(1978).
1 Post-Miranda decisions have relied on a case-by-case analysis of surrounding circum-
stances to determine the validity of a waiver. This type of analysis is similar to the pre-
Miranda approach that considers all the facts in determining the voluntariness of the confes-
sion. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403-06 (1977); Blackmon v. Blackledge, 541 F.2d
1070, 1073 (4th Cir. 1976) (waiver implied where defendant was given Miranda warnings
twice, failed to request attorney, was allowed to make telephone calls, and verbally acknowl-
edged understanding of his legal rights); United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 (1968) (fact that accused had presence of mind to make
phone calls and request attorney supports the conclusion that his waiver was knowingly
given); text accompanying note 55 infra. See also United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200,
1202 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 988 (1972); United States v. Glasgow, 451 F.2d 557, 558 (9th Cir. 1971); Klingler v.
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concluding that a juvenile has relinquished his constitutional rights.8
Recently, in Miller v. Maryland,9 the Fourth Circuit examined the role
which an accused's age plays in a court's determination whether a knowing
and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights has been made. State police,
investigating the murder of a young woman, had reason to believe sixteen
year old Miller was involved. The officers took Miller into custody at his
school and turned him over to a state trooper and county investigator for
questioning. 10 The investigators gave Miller the required Miranda warn-
ings and he subsequently responded that he would answer the interroga-
tors' questions." Miller was interrogated for approximately one and a half
hours, during which time he denied any complicity in the crime.2 At the
conclusion of the questioning, the officers conducted a physical examina-
tion of Miller 3 and turned him over to the county sheriff." After leaving
the police station, the investigators were instructed via radio to return to
the station because Miller had requested to see them in order to confess. 5
The officers again informed the youth of his constitutional rights and asked
him if he wanted to make a statement. 6 Miller responded affirmatively
and during two more hours of interrogation gave a detailed statement
admitting his involvement in the murder. The defendant, however, re-
fused to sign a written statement and indicated, for the first time, that he
wished to speak with his parents. 8 Miller was allowed to see his parents
and, upon their advice, refused to sign the statement. 9 The statement was
subsequently admitted into evidence at trial and Miller was convicted of
murder.2 0
On appeal of his conviction to the Maryland Court of Appeals, Miller
claimed that the police did not give him the required Miranda warnings,
United States, 409 F.2d 299, 308 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969); Bond v. United
States, 397 F.2d 162, 165 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1035 (1969); United States
v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134, 136-37 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 888 (1968).
a Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1962); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 164-
65 (1957); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948).
1 577 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978).
"9 Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 247 A.2d 530, 532 (1968), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S.
934 (1972).
" 247 A.2d at 532. The county investigator recited the Miranda warnings in simple,
direct language. Id. The investigator then asked Miller if, in view of his right to remain silent,






" Id. at 533.
'7 Id. at 533-37.
"Id. at 537. According to the officers, Miller did not ask for counsel when he asked to
speak with his parents. Id. In addition, the investigator admitted that they had made no
previous attempt to notify Miller's parents. Id.
Is Id.
2 Miller v. Maryland, 577 F.2d 1158, 1159 (4th Cir. 1978).
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did not allow him to see his parents, and fabricated the confession.2' The
police denied these allegations and the state court resolved the factual
dispute against Miller.22 Viewing the totality of the circumstances,2 the
state court found Miller's confession admissible,24 stressing that Miller was
given his Miranda rights twice, that there was no police misconduct, and
that Miller had requested the interview which lead to his inculpatory
statement.? Miller subsequently filed a habeas corpus action in federal
district court. The court dismissed the action upon finding that the state
court had applied the correct constitutional test and the record supported
the state court's findings of fact.26 The defendant appealed to the Fourth
Circuit, reasserting his allegations of police misconduct and contending
that the lower courts erred by failing to give adequate consideration to his
youth.? Though it acknowledged the duty of a court to take special care
with juvenile confessions, the Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court ruling
that Miller's confession was given knowingly and voluntarily.
28
The Fourth Circuit approved the totality of circumstances approach of
the state court and agreed that youth, while an important consideration,
is not by itself determinative of whether a valid waiver had been made.29
In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Haley v. Ohio,3 0
the leading Supreme Court case on juvenile confessions. In Haley, the
police arrested a fifteen year old suspect on a charge of murder. Haley was
informed of his right to remain silent but was never advised of his right to
counsel.3' Without Haley's parents or counsel present, police officers con-
tinuously interrogated Haley throughout the night.32 After finally obtain-
ing a confession from the youth, the police continued to hold him incom-
municado.3 3 The Supreme Court found Haley's confession inadmissible,
21 Id.
2 Id.
" Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 247 A.2d 530, 538-39 (1968). In determining the admissi-
bility of Miller's confession, the state court examined the circumstances surrounding the
confession in accordance with the accepted Fourth Circuit test. See note 36 infra.
11 247 A.2d at 539.
'Id.




- 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
11 Id. at 598.
12 Id. Although there was disputed evidence that Haley may have been beaten during
interrogation, id. at 597, the Court disregarded this evidence and considered only the undis-
puted testimony on the voluntariness of Haley's confession. Id. at 598.
13 Id. at 598-99. The Haley Court noted that even after his confession, Haley was held
incommunicado for three days. The attorney retained to represent him was refused admission
twice and Haley's mother was not allowed to see him for over five days after his arrest.
Although the state contended that this incommunicado detention after Haley's confession
was irrelevant to the issue of the confession's voluntariness, the Supreme Court disagreed,
finding that this treatment was evidence of the callous attitude of the police toward Haley's
constitutional rights. Id. at 600.
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relying on his age and the surrounding circumstances of the interrogation.34
In upholding the accused's confession in Miller, the Fourth Circuit recog-
nized the duty imposed by Haley, but nevertheless upheld the lower court
decision, noting that Miller had been given the Miranda warnings and that
the police had honored Miller's first request to see his parents.3
Lower court decisions have adopted an analysis in accordance with the
Haley decision, emphasizing the surrounding circumstances of a statement
obtained from a youth in police custody." Although youth is an important
factor in the totality of circumstances analysis, 3 courts have rejected the
premise that youth alone is sufficient to invalidate a confession. Addi-
3 Id. at 600-01. The Court concluded:
The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing,
the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the
police toward his rights combined to convince us that this was a confession wrung
from a child by means which the law should not sanction ... But we are told that
this boy was advised of his constitutional rights ... and that, knowing them, he
nevertheless confessed. That assumes, however, that a boy of fifteen, without aid
of counsel, would have a full appreciation of that advice and that on the facts of
this record he had a freedom of choice.
Id. at 601; see Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962) (lengthy incommunicado
detention and denial of attorney or parental presence coupled with accused's tender age were
sufficient reason to find confession inadmissible). The case-by-case analysis of surrounding
circumstances was consistent with Court policy on waiver of constitutional rights. See John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (determination of a valid waiver depends on each case's
particular facts and circumstances).
" 577 F.2d at 1159.
N Compare United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634, 636 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
923 (1972) (though juvenile's response that he understands and wishes to waive constitutional
rights is not conclusive of a valid waiver, where district judge noted that youth understood
his rights better than most adults and was not threatened by police, his waiver was suffi-
cient); United States v. Barfield, 507 F.2d 53, 56-57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950
(1975) (fact that youth signed a waiver form, had previous experience with police, and that
questioning took place in his home in his mother's presence tended to show competent
waiver); Cotton v. United States, 446 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1971) (absence of physical or
psychological coercion, combined with short duration of questioning and signing of waiver
form, allows conclusion that Miranda rights were validly waived by juvenile); Lopez v. United
States, 399 F.2d 865, 866-68 (9th Cir. 1968) (when youth questioned at home, had been read
his Miranda rights and his mother consented to the interrogation, record showed nothing to
indicate that he didn't understand and his inculpatory statement was admissible) and Ri-
chardson v. Vitek, 395 F.2d 478, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1968) (fifteen year old voluntarily waived
Miranda protections in a noncoercive situation where he was questioned only for short periods
of time, was fed, allowed to sleep and watch television) with Ledbetter v. Warden, 368 F.2d
490, 492 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967) (nineteen year old's confession
inadmissible since he had only eighth grade education, was not warned of his rights and his
requests to see his parents were denied); Burgos v. Follette, 448 F.2d 130, 131-33 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (inculpatory statement of defendant inadmissible
where defendant was sixteen years old at time of arrest, spoke only broken English, had third
grade reading level, was subjected to seven and a half hours of questioning without rest or
food, and was refused contact with his family); Walker v. State, 12 Md. App. 684, 707-09,
280 A.2d 260, 272-74 (1971) and In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110, 118-20 (1966).
" See note 36 supra.
u See Williams v. Peyton, 404 F.2d 528, 530-31 (4th Cir. 1968) (although youth is factor
in holding confession inadmissible, courts should also consider length of detention without
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tional factors concerning the youth's ability to make a valid waiver include
the defendant's mental capacity,39 emotional maturity," education41 and
prior contact with police.4" Courts also consider the intensity and length
of interrogation sessions43 and treatment by law enforcement officers" in
deciding the admissibility of a youth's confession. Thus, courts look not
only at the capabilities and experience of the juvenile, but also the physical
and psychological treatment of the juvenile suspect by the police.
In light of the present case law on juvenile waiver of Miranda rights,4"
the Fourth Circuit's disposition of Miller v. Maryland was correct. By
applying a totality of circumstances approach, the court properly affirmed
the lower court finding of a valid waiver by Miller. The youth was given
his Miranda warnings twice46 in simple, non-technical language.47 The ini-
tial questioning lasted for only one hour and a half and the second session
for approximately two hours.4" Between the periods of interrogation, Miller
was treated well and fed.4" Moreover, Miller had prior contact with the
police and was familiar with police procedure.50 Perhaps the most signifi-
counsel, any failure to send for parents or failure to take accused before a juvenile judge);
West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969)
(in determining knowing waiver against self-incrimination, relevant factors include defen-
dant's age, education, knowledge as to nature of his rights, any incommunicado detention,
methods and length of questioning and whether the youth later repudiated his confession);
note 36 supra.
11 Compare Coney v. Wyrick, 532 F.2d 94, 98 (8th Cir. 1976) (confession of youth of
subnormal intelligence is nonetheless voluntary due to such factors as the brief period of
questioning and attention given to physical needs) with Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142,
1144-46 (5th Cir. 1972) (two juveniles with subnormal I.Q.s were incapable of making an
intelligent waiver of their Miranda rights) and United States v. Hilliker, 436 F.2d 101, 103
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971) (youth with sixth grade education but very
high I.Q. made valid waiver of his constitutional rights).
10 See Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1977) (confession of seven-
teen year old admissible where his emotional maturity and prior criminal experience show
him to be more than a child); United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634, 636 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972) (that trial judge noted defendant understood his Miranda warn-
ings better than most adults lends credence to voluntariness of subsequent confession); West
v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968) (fact that minor lived and worked as an
adult hundred of miles from his parents illustrates a level of maturity necessary to validly
waive constitutional rights).
11 See Burgos v. Follette, 448 F.2d 130, 131-33 (2d Cir. 1971); Ledbetter v. Warden, 368
F.2d 490, 492 (4th Cir. 1966).
42 See Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1977); Blackmon v. Black-
ledge, 541 F.2d 1070, 1073 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Glasgow, 451 F.2d 557, 558 (9th
Cir. 1971).
13 See, e.g., Richardson v. Vitek, 395 F.2d 478, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1968).
"1 See, e.g., Cotton v. United States, 446 F.2d 107, 109-10 (8th Cir. 1971).
15 See text accompanying notes 36-44 supra.
11 See Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 247 A.2d 530, 533 (1968). See also Blackmon v.
Blackledge, 541 F.2d 1070, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1976); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 943
(5th Cir. 1968); In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248 A.2d 364, 367 (1968).
'7 See Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 247 A.2d 530, 532 (1968).
" 247 A.2d at 532; see text accompanying note 43 supra.
" 247 A.2d at 532; see text accompanying note 44 supra.
0 Although the majority did not rely upon Miller's prior conviction, the dissenting opin-
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cant factor was Miller's request that the investigating officers return to the
police station in order that he might make a statement. Such a request
supports a finding that the confession was given voluntarily.
5 1
One significant and controversial factor, however, was not considered
by the court. Miller's parents were not consulted or present during interro-
gation.5 2 The majority of federal and state courts employ a totality of
circumstances approach and hold that the absence of a youth's parents
does not necessarily render a confession inadmissible. 53 Several states,
however, automatically disallow juvenile confessions where the youth has
not consulted with a parent or attorney before waiving his constitutional
rights.Y Many advocates of this per se rule criticize the totality of circum-
stances approach as retaining the same inherent problems of the pre-
Miranda "voluntariness" approach. 5 Miranda disposed of the earlier
subjective "voluntariness" analysis that considered all facts to determine
the confession's validity in favor of an absolute requirement that a suspect
always be advised of his rights." Similarly, proponents of the parental
ion alluded to the fact that the district court considered it. See Miller v. Maryland, 577 F.2d
1158, 1161 (4th Cir. 1978) (Lay, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the lower court for
considering this factor; however, prior convictions are frequently considered by courts. See
text accompanying note 42 supra.
51 See In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248 A.2d 364, 368 (1968) (fact that juvenile informed
police on the way to jail cell that he wished to make statement lends element of voluntariness
to his confession); Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 313, 239 A.2d 761, 766 (1968) (fact that juvenile
and his parents contacted police to surrender tends to support finding of admissibility of
statement); State v. Lay, 427 S.W.2d 394, 399 (Mo. 1968) (where juvenile, who was present
at police station to help police identify "killer" and was never under suspicion, requested to
speak with police captain, his subsequent confession was admissible).
11 Miller was allowed to see his parents upon his first request, which came after his
confession. See Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 247 A.2d 530, 537 (1968). See generally Note,
Preadjudicatory Confessions and Consent Searches: Placing the Juvenile on the Same Consti-
tutional Footing as an Adult, 57 B.U.L. REV. 778 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Preadjudicatory
Confessions]; Comment, Interrogation of Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's Presence, 77
DicK. L. Ray. 543 (1973); Comment, The Admissibility of Juvenile Confessions: Is an Intelli-
gent and Knowing Waiver of Constitutional Rights Possible Without Adult Guidance?, 34
Prrr. L. Rav. 321 (1972).
3 See State v. Hardy, 107 Ariz. 583, 491 P.2d 625 (1967); People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365,
432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968); State v. Young, 220
Kan. 541, 552 P.2d 905, 916 (1976); Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850, 857
(1974); Mullin v. State, 505 P.2d 305, 309 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 940 (1973);
Preadjudicatory Confessions, supra note 52, at 782.
1 See Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431,-288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1972); In re Dino, 359 So. 2d
586, 594 (La. 1978); In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 283 (Mo. App. 1973). See also Weather-
spoon v. State, 328 So. 2d 875, 876 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269,
174 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1970).
Some courts requiring an adult presence to render a juvenile's confession admissible have
relied on state statutes which require notification of parents upon the arrest or detaining of
the child. See In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Mo. App. 1973). However, many states
have similar statutes and still consider the failure of police to notify parents as only one factor
in their totality of circumstances approach. See Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d
850, 856-57 (1974).
See Preadjudicatory Confessions, supra note 52, at 784-85.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
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presence rule argue that such an absolute requirement is necessary for the
protection of juveniles. Although recognizing the application of the totality
of circumstances approach to the waiver issue when dealing with adults,
proponents of a parental presence requirement urge that this standard is
not sufficient when dealing with juveniles. Advocates of a per se rule claim
that Miranda warnings are not sufficient for children, since they lack the
emotional maturity to withstand interrogation and mental capacity to
understand the consequences of the waiver. Therefore, a requirement that
a youth's parents or attorney be present during interrogation is necessary
to place juveniles on the same level as adults when giving a waiver of their
Miranda rights . 7 The Supreme Court, however, has not specifically ruled
whether the advice or presence of an attorney or parent is constitutionally
required before a juvenile may effectively waive his Miranda rights.58
The Fourth Circuit's disposition of Miller was consistent with the pre-
vailing rule that the admissibility of juvenile confessions rests on an analy-
sis of the totality of circumstances. Perhaps, however, the Fourth Circuit
should re-evaluate its totality of circumstances approach and consider
adopting the per se rule disallowing any juvenile confession made without
advice from an attorney or parent. The rights which a juvenile waives are
crucial ones, while the expedient of requiring presence of counsel or parent
is simple. Judgments of the effect of surrounding circumstances on a
youth in each case can never be more than subjective speculations." In
addition, police will be less likely to exert coercion with an adult present
to protect the juvenile's rights. These factors, among others, suggest that
the Fourth Circuit consider joining the growing number of courts recogniz-
ing that a youth should not be allowed to waive fundamental constitutional
protections without the presence of his parents or attorney to assure that
he does so with full knowledge of the consequences of his actions.
CHERYL I. HARRIS
C. Right to Counsel
In 1977, the Fourth Circuit in Marzullo v. Maryland' announced a new
17 See Preadjudicatory Confessions, supra note 52, at 784-85.
" Justices Marshall and Brennan maintain that the Supreme Court should address the
issue of a parental presence rule. See Riley v. Illinois, 98 S. Ct. 1657, 1658-59 (1978) (Marshall
and Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of cert.); Little v. Arkansas, 98 S. Ct. 1590, 1591-93
(1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
:9 See In re Dino, 359 So.2d 586, 592 (La. 1978).
0 Id.
561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978). In Marzullo, the
defendant claimed inadequate representation, alleging that his attorney had not protected
his rights at the voir dire examination since the attorney mentioned the defendant's prior
convictions in the jurors' presence. Id. at 545-47. The court, while adopting a test based on
reasonable competence, stressed that effective assistance does not mean errorless representa-
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standard for effectiveness of counsel in criminal cases.2 Under Marzullo,
the measure of effectiveness is whether representation is within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.3 While the full
ramifications in Marzullo are unclear,4 reasonable competence is the stan-
tion. An error which is merely tactical is not reversible on appeal. Id. at 544. In the Marzullo
test, the Fourth Circuit subsumed the specific criteria for effectiveness articulated in Coles
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). 561 F.2d at 543. For an
extensive discussion of the specific criteria developed in Marzullo, see Note, Habeas Corpus
and Prisoners' Rights, 35 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 564, 573-77 (1978).
The sixth amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel, and the
Supreme Court has stressed the fundamental nature of this right on several occasions. See,
e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1965); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1958);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2 The Marzullo court followed the Supreme Court standard for legal advice concerning
guilty pleas set forth in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 562 F.2d at 544. Most
circuits have adopted the reasoning of McMann in their standards of effective assistance.
Three circuits use the test of "reasonably effective assistance." See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris,
551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Two circuits require assistance to exhibit
"customary skill." See, e.g., United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970). The Seventh
Circuit demands a minimum standard of professional representation. United States ex rel.
Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975). The
Second and Tenth Circuits still adhere to the farce and mockery standard. See, LiPuma v.
Commissioner, 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); Gillihan v. Rodriquez,
551 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977).
The farce and mockery and reasonable effectiveness tests are not, however, the only tests
used. See, e.g., People v. Degraffenreid, 19 Mich. App. 702, 173 N.W.2d 317 (1969) (Michi-
gan's two-tiered test consisting of initial inquiry based on farce and mockery test, and, failing
initial test, "serious mistake/fair trial" test). The criticism of the farce and mockery test is
that a trial need not be a farce for a violation of due process to occur. The weakness of the
normal competency test lies in its automatic reversal of any conviction in which the attorney's
error rendered representation below the level of normal competence. See Note, Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Right to a Fair Trial, 22 WAYNE L. Rav. 913 (1976).
561 F.2d at 544. For a discussion of the relationship of more stringent effective assis-
tance standards to the remedy of criminal malpractice suits, see Kaus and Mallen, The
Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflection on Criminal Malpractice, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1191
(1974).
1 Other than the cases treated textually and at Note 98, infra, two additional cases
warrant attention for a thorough understanding of the Marzullo standard. In Tolliver v.
United States, 563 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1977), the court ruled that defense counsel had pro-
vided inadequate assistance due to ignorance of applicable law. The defense attorneys in
Tolliver were on notice that the effect of Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), might
lessen the force of the defendant's prior convictions on his sentence. 563 F.2d at 1120. The
attorney had advised the defendant to plead guilty relying on the law as it stood prior to that
Supreme Court case. On the basis of Leary, the defendant wanted to withdraw his guilty plea,
but in advancing his cause, his attorneys neither researched Leary nor confessed their igno-
rance of it as a reason to permit withdrawal of the plea. Id.
In Springer v. Collins, 444 F.Supp. 1049 (D.Md. 1977), the district court held that, absent
any peril to trial tactics, defense counsel denied the defendant effective assistance by failing
to explore or discuss with his client" an insanity plea. Since the defense counsel knew of the
defendant's past drug problems and of his consumption of excessive amounts of drugs and
alcohol prior to the act, counsel should have investigated the defense of alcoholic psychosis
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dard for effective counsel in the Fourth Circuit. 5
Effective Assistance and the Need for a Psychiatrist
In Satterfield v. Zahradnickj the Fourth Circuit discussed the extent
to which the sixth amendment 7 obligates a state court to assist a defendant
in the preparation of his insanity defense.8 In the original state proceeding,
the state had ordered a psychiatric examination of the defendant pursuant
to Virginia law.9 The report stated that Satterfield was competent to
in alleging that the intent requisite for guilt was lacking. See Parker v. State, 7 Md. App.
161, 178-79, 254 A.2d 381 (1969), cert. denied 402 U.S. 984 (1971).
561 F.2d at 544. The Fourth Circuit's concept of reasonableness is based upon a tort
standard. Id. at n.9, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 299A (1965), Undertaking in
Profession or Trade. (tort standard for professional malpractice).
572 F.2d 443 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 98 S. Ct. 2270 (1978).
See Note 1 supra.
For a discussion of the statutory obligation of the state to determine competency to
stand trial, see note 9 infra. Despite an adverse determination by the state psychiatrist, the
defendant may still raise the defense of insanity at trial. Graham v. Gathright, 345 F. Supp.
1148, 1150 (W.D. Va. 1972); Owsley v. Cunningham, 190 F. Supp. 608, 614 (E.D. Va. 1961).
In Virginia, insanity is determined according to the M'Naghten rule supplemented by the
"irresistible impulse" test. Christian v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 311, 117 S.E. 2d 72 (1960).
Accordingly a person is deemed insane if unable to understand the nature of his act, to
distinguish right from wrong, or to resist action because of irresistible impulse. Id. For Discus-
sion of the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests, see LAFAvE & Scorr, CRImiNAL LAw, §
37 (1972); Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity
Defense, 110 U.PA. L. REV. 1061 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein & Fine]; Livermore
& Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REv. 789 (1967); Moore, M'Naghten is
Dead-Or is it? 3 Hous. L. REv. 58 (1965).
The court applied VA. CODE ANN. 19.1-228 (1950), currently codified at 19.2-169 (1975)
entitled When question of sanity is raised, commitment before trial. Section 19.1-228 states:
If prior to the time for trial of any person charged with a crime, either the court or
attorney for the Commonwealth has reason to believe that such person is in such
mental condition that his confinement in a hospital for the insane or a colony for
the feeble-minded is necessary for proper care and observation, the court or the
judge thereof may, after hearing evidence on the subject, commit such person...
under such limitation as it may order pending the determination of his mental
condition. In any such case, the court, in its discretion, may appoint one or more
physicians skilled in the diagnosis of insanity, or other qualified physicians, and
when any person is alleged to be feeble-minded may likewise appoint persons
skilled in the diagnosis of feeble-mindedness not to exceed three, to examine the
defendant before such commitment is ordered, make such investigation of the case
as they may deem necessary and report to the court the condition of the defendant
at the time of their examination...
Satterfield is consistent with prior cases interpreting § 19.1-228. See, e.g., Payne v. Slayton,
329 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Va. 1971) (defendant received effective assistance where attorney
raised defendant's insanity plea at trial and relied solely on lay witnesses to support defense);
Owsley v. Cunningham, 190 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Va. 1961)(due process clause requires only
that state provide defendant with mental examination if competency doubtful).
The courts have taken judicial notice of the legislative intent of § 19.1-228 to assure that
when the defendant's mental capacity to stand trial is in doubt, the defendant shall not be
jeopardized without an initial inquiry into his present mental condition. Payne v. Slayton,
329 F. Supp. at 889. In Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1967), the court held that an
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stand trial,'0 however it only briefly addressed the problem of blood sugar
imbalance, the medical condition upon which the defendant planned to
base his defense." Due to this shortcoming in the report, Satterfield, an
indigent, requested the assistance of a psychiatrist at state expense. 2 The
trial court refused the request, Satterfield was convicted, and the Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.' 3 After being refused a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court,"' Satterfield appealed to the Fourth
Circuit alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel.'
The Fourth Circuit held that a defendant has no constitutional right to the
appointment of a private psychiatrist of his own choice at state expense.
The court further held that since the psychiatric examination ordered by
the state in the initial proceeding fulfilled all the proper statutory require-
ments adequate opportunity existed to bring any issue concerning the
defendant's sanity to the attention of the trial court.'6
The court's finding of thoroughness regarding the psychiatric report
was based both on the scope of the report and defense counsel's treatment
of it.'" The findings of competency to stand trial and knowledge of the
nature and quality of the acts were considered sufficient to bring any
attorney who doubts his client's mental competence has a duty to bring it to the attention of
the court, id. at 569, but failure to have a defendant examined is not a determination that
he is sane. Id. at 568; cf. Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1963) (judge's duty
to order mental examination where he questions defendant's mental competence).
The purpose of the statute is not, however, to assist the defendant in the determination
or formation of an insanity plea. Tucker v. Peyton, 271 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Va. 1967) (no
abuse of discretion in refusing § 19.1-228 mental competence hearing where petitioner's
testimony indicates understanding of charges against him and ability to assist in his own
defense). Furthermore, the defendant's burden of proving his own insanity is well-established.
See Graham v. Gathright, 345 F.Supp. 1157 (W.D. Va. 1972); Payne v. Slayton, 329 F.Supp.
886 (W.D. Va. 1971).
N 575 F.2d at 445. Appellant's contention was that his blood sugar imbalance created a
hypoglycemic condition so acute it rendered him criminally irresponsible. Brief for Appellant
at 12, Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1978).
" Brief for Appellant at 12, Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1978).
It 572 F.2d at 445.
13 Id.
" Id.
"1 Satterfield claimed that his constitutional rights had been abridged in three other
instances. He alleged constitutional violation when the prosecutor made a pejorative com-
ment to the jury concerning Satterfield's failure to testify in his own behalf. 572 F.2d at 445.
The court held that this might have constituted error under the rule of Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965), but for counsel's failure to object to the statement when made. 572 F.2d
at 446. According to state law, an error not objected to at trial may not be raised upon appeal,
Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 148 S.E.2d 820 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909
(1967). Satterfield also contested the constitutionality of Virginia's application of presump-
tions of malice from an unlawful homicide and of premeditation from use of a weapon in prior
possession of the accused. The circuit court avoided consideration of these issues because they
had not been raised prior to the appeal. 572 F.2d at 446.
" 572 F.2d at 445.
'7 The court took notice of the fact that defense counsel was not contesting the objectivity
of the information contained in the report. Id., accord, McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151,
157 (1st Cir. 1951).
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questions of sanity before the court. The allegation of defense counsel had
been that the report was both incomplete in that it did not discuss the
blood sugar problem and erroneous in that it found the defendant sane at
the time of the commission of the acts.'8 The court never mentioned the
blood sugar problem and dismissed the allegations of error as a mere incon-
sistency between the report and the testimony of a physician who appeared
for the defense.'8 The Fourth Circuit concluded that, given the state
court's application of the statute requiring a psychiatric examination, the
state owed the defendant no further constitutional duty.
The extent of a state court's duty to assist a defendant in his insanity
defense was discussed by the Supreme Court in United States ex. rel.
Smith v. Baldi,20 a case cited by the Satterfield court.2 ' In Smith v. Baldi,
the Supreme Court held that the state has no constitutional duty to ap-
point a psychiatrist to give technical pre-trial assistance to a defendant
who has been found competent to stand trial.22 In Smith v. Baldi, the
defendant had introduced evidence to support an insanity plea.2 Although
a psychiatrist had examined the defendant at the court's request and
testified that the defendant was sane at the time of commission and com-
petent to stand trial, the defendant on appeal24 contended that the assis-
tance of a psychiatrist was necessary to afford him adequate counsel. 25 The
facts of Smith v. Baldi are strikingly similar to those of Satterfield. In both
cases the defense was objecting to the inability to have a chosen expert
examine the defendant and assist in the formulation and presentation of
a defense. 26 In both Satterfield2n and Smith v. Baldi8 the defense intro-
duced testimony and documentation addressing the issue of mental com-
petence. The Smith Court held that the state never has a constitutional
obligation to a defendant pleading insanity beyond the determination of
competence to stand trial.
2 9
" Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Satterfield v. Zabradnick, 572 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1978).
" 572 F.2d at 445.
22 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
2, 572 F.2d at 445.
2 344 U.S. at 568; see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (presumption of sanity of
defendant may be circumscribed by state prescriptions of quantum of proof and legal tests
of sanity).
344 U.S. at 568.
24 Id.
23 Id.
" Id.; Brief for Appellant at 15, Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1978).
27 572 F.2d at 445. In Satterfield, in support of the insanity plea, the defense introduced
lay witnesses and a psychiatrist who had not examined the defendant for the alleged infirm-
ity. Id.
344 U.S. at 568.
21 Id. The facts in Smith raised the specific questions of whether the state should have
allowed the defendant to plead guilty without formal adjudication on the question of mental
competency and whether the defendant should have been allowed to plead at all to a capital
offense without the benefit of a mental examination. Id. at 565. The force of Smith has been
minimized by subsequent Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the court's duty to keep
abreast of any changes in the defendant's mental condition even after the determination of
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The rule in Smith v. Baldi that no constitutional duty exists beyond
the determination of competency to stand trial differs from the rule of
McGarty v. O'Brien,3" a First Circuit case cited by both the Satterfield3'
and Smith2 courts. Whereas Smith was decided on the basis of the sixth
amendment right to counsel," McGarty was decided on fourteenth amend-
ment due process grounds.Y In McGarty two psychiatrists who had exam-
ined the defendant at the court's order found him sane.3 McGarty then
requested that the state pay for two other psychiatrists to assist him in the
preparation of his insanity defense." The defendant argued that his indi-
gency prevented him from fully developing a defense.7 The court denied
the defendant's request, reasoning that doctors designated to examine de-
fendants, although paid by the state, are no more agents of the prosecution
than appointed counsel." Reasoning that psychiatrists are impartial pro-
competency to stand trial has been made. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate
v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (even though no competence examination requested at trial,
due process may demand mid-trial inquiry into defendant's sanity). Although Smith is often
cited, no circuit in the last decade has cited Smith for the proposition that a defendant never
has a constitutional right to a psychiatrist. See United States ex rel. McGurvin v. Shovlin,
455 F.2d 1278, 1279 (3d Cir.) cert. denied 407 U.S. 913 (1972) (citing Smith for proposition
that defendant has due process right to statutory hearing on mental competence); United
States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984 (1973) (citing
Smith to hold that impartial expert appointed by court is court's witness and may testify as
to his findings). But see United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 383-84 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobel-
off, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (saying that Smith held that defendant has no
constitutional right to psychiatrist, but then giving string citation of Supreme Court cases to
show considerable erosion of Smith). Furthermore, several circuits, including the Fourth,
have ruled that at times the need for a psychiatrist rises to constitutional dimensions. See
United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d
907 (8th Cir. 1970); Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965).
10 188 F.2d 151 (lst Cir. 1951).
11 572 F.2d at 445.
3 344 U.S. at 568.
33 Id.




Id. at 155-56; accord, Proctor v. Harris, 413 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Proctor, the
court noted that from a defendant's viewpoint a psychiatrist is not of any assistance unless
he corroborates the claim of insanity. Proctor concerned a defendant seeking habeas corpus
relief. Id. at 384. The defendant had requested an independent psychiatric examination after
the court-ordered report found him sane and ineligible for release. The court said that
"psychiatrists are physicians not advocates," and took judicial notice of the fact that govern-
ment psychiatrists as a whole were more favorable to defendants than to prosecutors in
assessing insanity defenses. Id. at 387-88. The role of the physician in legal controversies,
however, is not as purely scientific as the Proctor opinion suggests. Physicians who determine
a defendant's competency face the difficulty of making a medical assessment based on legal
standards. Rosenberg, Competency For Trial: A Problem In Interdisciplinary
Communication, 53 JuD. 316, 317 (1970). As a result, the question of competency is just as
much a legal issue as a medical one. Id. Since physicians are advised to write their reports in
a logically reasoned style that will assist the jurist, the reports are not purely medical. C.
WECirr, A WATSON & S. POLLACK, MEDICAL AND PsYctATRIc TEsTmoy IN CPimNAL CAsEs, 195
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fessionals, the First Circuit found the district court correct in denying the
defendant's request.39 The court did not choose to consider the extent to
which the psychiatrist could act as an advocate, although the court did say
that in certain situations such a claim might be valid.", McGarty merely
holds that the facts of the case do not impose a fourteenth amendment
duty on the part of the state to provide psychiatric assistance in the formu-
lation of a defense. 41 McGarty thus establishes a case-by-case analysis for
the determination of additional psychiatric assistance. In Smith, on the
other hand, the Supreme Court held that regardless of the facts of the case,
a trial court need not assist a defendant in the construction of an insanity
defense."
The Fourth Circuit's discussion of the merits of Satterfield's claim for
a psychiatrist indicates its preference for the case-by-case approach of
McGarty.41 While the Satterfield court held that the defendant had no
constitutional right to the appointment of a psychiatrist of his own choos-
ing, the court nevertheless seemed quite satisfied that counsel had suffi-
cient information to raise a colorable claim of insanity.4 The Satterfield
opinion does not preclude the possibility of certain circumstances creating
a legitimate sixth or fourteenth amendment claim for a psychiatrist of
one's own choice. The case-by-case analysis which the Fourth Circuit uti-
lized is consistent with its individual case test for effective assistance of
(1968) [hereinafter cited as WEcHT, WATSON AND POLLACK]. The authors suggest that the
psychiatric profession is neither at ease with nor fully cognizant of its role in legal disputes.
Id. at 182. The problem exists, therefore, that, although psychiatrists are often called upon
as experts, there is no reason to think that they understand legal issues any better than any
other laymen. Id. at 185.
31 188 F.2d at 154-55.
40 Id.
Id. at 157.
42 344 U.S. at 568.
13 A significant distinction exists between McGarty and Smith. McGarty was decided
on the basis of a fourteenth amendment claim whereas Smith presented the Court with an
allegation of denial of sixth amendment rights. The McGarty court's consideration of the
circumstances surrounding the petitioner's claim, as well as the due process safeguards pro-
vided by the state, demonstrates that a fourteenth amendment claim precludes any blanket
rule. 188 F.2d at 157. The Smith court declared, however, that psychiatric assistance was
collateral to the guarantee of the sixth amendment. 344 U.S. at 568. The Smith decision has
been criticized as too broad, while the case-by-case analysis of McGarty has received praise
for the latitude granted trial judges in deciding whether the absence of a psychiatrist assisting
the defendant would preclude a fair trial. Goldstein & Fine, supra note 8, at 1087.
1 572 F.2d at 445. Along with McGarty, the Fourth Circuit cited Proctor v. Harris, 413
F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1969), see note 38 supra, as support for the holding that a defendant has
no constitutional right to a private psychiatrist of his own choosing. 572 F.2d at 455. But see
Goldstein & Fine, supra note 8, at 1062 (due to nature of adversary proceedings, proposition
that fairness can result from situations where one party's legal, investigative, and expert
resources grossly outweight other's is unrealistic). Thus, regardless of the nature of the state's
psychiatric report, the defendant should be accorded psychiatric assistance as part of his
sixth amendment right since such aid is anything but collateral to a thorough and effective
defense. Id. at 1087. Goldstein & Fine also contend that an insanity plea without the aid of a
psychiatrist generally would be successful only in cases so extreme that the prosecutor would
probably drop the charge. Id. at 1064.
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counsel.45 A situation might arise in which the court would determine that
the defendant had not been afforded effective assistance because of the
absence .of psychiatric help. In such a case, ineffective assistance would
result from a liberal court standard" and a rather conservative state stat-
ute limiting psychiatric help.47
Disposition by the Fourth Circuit of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in a state proceeding requires a subtle balance between the state's
sovereignty and the jurisdiction of the federal court over habeas corpus
claims."8 Where the federal court has original jurisdiction, Congress has
provided for expert assistance to indigents.49 Thus, while the issue in
Satterfield would not arise when a federal court has original jurisdiction,
the availability of this assistance may raise questions concerning the sixth
amendment right to counsel. In Proffitt v. United States15 the Fourth
Circuit examined the extent to which the sixth amendment5 demands that
a court-appointed attorney in a federal case pursue a possible insanity
defense. The issue in Proffitt was whether the attorney had denied his
client effective assistance by failing to petition the trial court for a psychia-
trist at government expense.
Proffitt had been convicted in federal district court of a bank robbery
charge and faced another trial for a similar offense.52 His attorney visited
him in jail and at that time Proffitt inquired whether anything else could
be done to prevent his conviction at the second trial.53 His attorney an-
swered that the possibility of an insanity defense existed, but that any
possibility of success depended upon concealing the defense from the gov-
ernment until trial.54 Accordingly, the attorney reasoned that legal counsel
would have to be retained privately at a cost of $5,000,51 and that the
defendant would have to pay $5,000 for the necessary psychiatric examina-
tions.56 Because the defendant could not afford the private examination,
I Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977). In dicta, the Marzullo -court said
that each defendant must establish that in his case defense counsel's error resulted from
neglect or ignorance. Id. at 544.
11 Id.; see notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra.
' Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169 (1975) (state provides no assistance beyond deter-
mination of competency to stand trial) with Nav. REv. STAT. § 7.135 (1975) and N.C. GEs.
STAT. § 7A-450 (1969) (additional assistance for indigents upon showing of need).
" 28 U.S.C. §2241 (1976).
18 U.S.C. §3006A(e) (1973); see note 57 infra.
582 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1978).
" See note 1 supra.
52 582 F.2d at 856.
3 Id. at 855-56.
mId. at 856.
3 Id.; application for additional assistance would have compelled disclosure of the de-
fense to the prosecution. See note 56 infra.
0 582 F.2d at 856. The attorney's avowed intention in requiring a retainer and the
defendant's payment of psychiatric expenses was to circumvent the rule in United States v.
Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968). According to Proffitt's counsel, Albright held that
disclosure of the intention to employ an insanity defense might result in the court ordering
the defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination. If the defense were to obtain a
government-paid psychiatric examination under the auspices of the Criminal Justice Act, see
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the attorney did not pursue the insanity defense.
The Fourth Circuit held that by conditioning investigation and presen-
tation of an insanity defense upon a $10,000 expenditure, Proffitt's court-
appointed attorney had not provided adequate representation. The court
held that the attorney's conduct was contrary to the purpose of the Crimi-
nal Justice Act of 1964, 5 case law,5" and the directives of the American Bar
Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice." Consequently, the court remanded the case, directed the district
court to appoint a psychiatrist, and ordered a new trial contingent upon
defense counsel agreeing to build a defense around the findings of the
note 57 infra, the defense attorney reasoned that this would destroy the element of surprise
necessary as a trial tactic in the presentation of the defense. The circuit court rejected the
defense attorney's reading of Albright. 582 F.2d at 858. The court reasoned that Albright was
not intended to force indigents to be examined by government psychiatrists; rather, the
purpose was to give the government the opporutnity to carry its burden of proof on the
insanity issue. Id. Regardless of the intent of Albright, a request for a government-paid
examination would have forced the defense to disclose its reasons for thinking that such an
examination was necessary. The element of surprise would have been destroyed. See Tippett
v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) (construing Albright to state that when defendant
has raised insanity issue he has waived his right to silence).
18 U.S.C. §3006A (1973) codifies the Criminal Justice Act of 1964. The Act was in-
tended to insure adequate representation to impecunious defendants. 582 F.2d at 857, citing
S. RE. No. 346, 88th Cong., lst Sess. 1 (1963). Subsection (e) applies to Proffitt and reads,
in relevant part:
SERVICES OTHER THAN COUNSEL. Counsel for a defendant who is financially unable to
obtain investigative, experts, or other services necessary to an adequate defense in
his case may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropri-
ate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the
defendant is financially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel
to obtain the services on behalf of the defendant. The court may, in the interests
of justice, and upon a finding that timely procurement of necessary services could
not await prior authorization ratify such services after they have been obtained.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1973), as amended by Act of Sept. 3, 1974, Pub. L. 93-412, § 3, 88 Stat.
1093.
- See United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976) (indigent defendant with
recent history of mental illness and where insanity sole issue in case, counsel ineffective when
additional assistance not sought); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971) (where
court's initial inquiry is insufficient for insanity defense, failure to grant additional assistance
comprises denial of right to effective assistance); Owsley v. Peyton, 368 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.
1966) (failure of attorney in state case to alert court to doubt of defendant's sanity renders
assistance of counsel ineffective).
11 582 F.2d at 859. ABA STADARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 1.5 (serv-
ice provided to defendant should include investigatory and expert services for effective de-
fense both at trial and non-trial phases); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 3.9 (attorneys should provide same quality of service to indigents as to paying clients). But
see Brief for Appellant, appendix p. 90, Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1978)
(district court judge thought defense would have been meritless); CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REspONSImILI, EC 7-4 (advocate may urge any permissible construction of law favorable to
client without regard to his professional opinion as to likelihood that construction will ulti-
mately prevail; however, lawyer is not justified in asserting frivolous position in litigation).
See also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, rehearing denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1967) (when
on appeal counsel discovers his position is frivolous, he should advise court and request
permission to withdraw appeal).
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psychiatrist. 0 According to the court,6' Proffitt's constitutional claim origi-
nated in the denial of "the opportunity to determine with expert help
whether he had a defense worth presenting.
6 2
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 permits an attorney to obtain nonlegal
assistance at government expense.63 To qualify under the Act, the attorney
must demonstrate the necessity of the services to an adequate defense" as
well as the defendant's inability to pay. 5 As articulated in Proffitt, the
Criminal Justice Act guarantees adequate representation to defendants
unable to afford experts necessary for a thorough investigation of all ave-
nues of defense.6 In Proffitt the Fourth Circuit extended the language of
the statute so that instead of an attorney's option to apply for services
other than counsel, a duty to apply exists when an insanity defense is a
reasonable possibility.67 Thus, even though Proffitt's attorney reasoned
that the request of these funds would in itself make the insanity defense
unworthy of further pursuit, he had an obligation to request the assis-
tance. 8 The duty to request assistance arises from the standard of repre-
sentation which lawyers must provide to their clients. 9 Proffitt indicates
that the court views the Criminal Justice Act as so central to the concept
of effective assistance that an attorney's failure to exploit its provisions
constitutes a denial of the defendant's sixth amendment rights. 0
582 F.2d at 859-60, citing United States y. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971).
61. 582 F.2d at 859.
'2 Contra, Brief for Appellant, appendix p. 90, Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854 (4th
Cir. 1978) (district court judge thought counsel was "drumming up a defense"); Proffitt v.
United States, 582 F.2d at 861 (Widener, J., dissenting).
' See note 57 supra.
" Id. Sde United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1976) (word "necessary" must
be construed with intention of Criminal Justice Act in mind); United States v. Chavis, 476
F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quality rather than quantity of expert assistance is crucial in
determining necessity and validity of requests); United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th
Cir. 1971) (what is "necessary" is not susceptible to test; rather determination must be made
on case-by-case basis); Christian v. United States, 398 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1968) (ascertaining
necessity requires ex parte determination of need); United States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 961 (1967) (denial of motion not erroneous where defendant
failed to demonstrate that denial resulted in ineffective assistance).
" See note 59, supra; United States v. Chavis, 476F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (determina-
tion of defendant's inability to pay essential for qualification under terms of Act); United
States v. Birell, 470 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1972) (rehearing on indigency unnecessary when new
counsel appointed); United States v. Cohen, 419 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1969) (question not
whether defendant destitute, but rather whether legal representation beyond his means).
582 F.2d at 856; accord, United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Grammer, 513 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137 (DC.
Cir. 1973); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1974);
United States v. Tate, 419 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1969).
67 Cf. United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976) (attorney determines pro-
priety of seeking additional assistance). But see United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907 (8th
Cir. 1970) (court ought not authorize mere "fishing expeditions" in ruling on 18 U.S.C:
§3006A(e) motions).
582 F.2d at 859.
Id. at 857; see Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977).
582 F.2d at 857.
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The Fourth Circuit supported its view of the Criminal Justice Act by
reference to two sections of the applicable ABA Standards." From the
Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, the court derived sup-
port for the proposition than an indigent should have access to expert
services." From the Standards Relating to the Defense Function, the court
asserted that an appointed lawyer must represent his indigent client with
the same vigor as he would a paying client. 3 Thus, the ABA Standards
taken in conjunction with the Criminal Justice Act provide the ethical and
statutory basis for the proposition that whenever the possibility exists that
expert assistance might aid an indigent in the exploration of potential
defenses, the attorney must apply to the court for assistance under the
Criminal Justice Act.
Finally, the court examined case law to determine that the Criminal
Justice Act applies to psychiatric help74 and that the failure of a defense
attorney to seek psychiatric assistance when the need is apparent is a
deprivation of the defendant's sixth amendment rights. 5 The court rea-
soned further that failure to bring to the court's attention the attorney's
uncertainty as to the mental competence of the defendant denies the de-
fendant his right to counsel.76 The court concluded that the only remedy
for these failures is to grant the defendant a new trial.
77
Proffitt has established "objective criteria '7 8 to determine the effective-
ness of counsel for indigents.79 Attorneys must utilize experts who are
necessary to the defense of indigents to the same extent that those experts
would be used for a defendant of unlimited means. 0 Additionally, attor-
neys must apply to the court for financial assistance under the Criminal
Justice Act whenever the need is apparent,8 ' and must inform the court of
any doubts they have as to the defendant's sanity."
" Id. See note 59 supra.
7 582 F.2d at 857.
3 Id.
" Id., citing United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971).
582 F.2d at 857, citing United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976).
582 F.2d at 857, citing Owsley v. Peyton, 368 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1966).
" 582 F.2d at 859.
7' Id. at 857-58.
" See notes 59 & 67 supra.
See 582 F.2d at 857; United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1975), citing
United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1973), United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d
713, 716-17 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (18 U.S.C. §3006A(e) requires judge to
authorize services whenever reasonable attorney would employ such service for client of
independent financial means); Seff v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 548 (D. Tenn. 1977)
(indigent may not be granted rights not possessed by non-indigents).
, 582 F.2d at 857. But cf. United States v. Cox, 439 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971); United States v. Meek, 388 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
951 (1968) (absent clear indication of incompetence or prejudice to defendant, failure of
attorney to utilize §3006A(e) will not be attacked on theory that it was part of trial strategy).
12 582 F.2d at 857; accord United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1974);
Andrews v. United States, 403 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1968). Contra, Marcelin v. Mancusi, 462
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Using these standards, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the attorney's
demand for payment of a fee and expenses for the necessary expert assis-
tance contravened the obvious intent of the Criminal Justice Act by condi-
tioning the presentation of a defense upon the defendant's economic cir-
cumstances. His demand for payment of attorney's fees was contrary to
the ABA Standards since the attorney was not providing the indigent with
the same services he would provide to a paying client."4 Likewise, counsel's
failure to bring to the attention of the court his doubts about the defen-
dant's sanity contravened case law 5 as did his failure to petition the court
for funds under the Criminal Justice Act." In virtually every phase of his
conduct relating to the investigation and presentation of the possible in-
sanity defense, the court found the attorney deficient.87
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Proffitt from the situation8 in which
' 582 F.2d at 858.
See note 59 supra.
U 582 F.2d at 857. However, the dissent noted that neither the trial judge nor the defense
attorney doubted the defendant's sanity. Id. at 561 (Widener, J., dissenting).
" 582 F.2d at 859. See note 67 supra.
0 582 F.2d at 858-59. The Fourth Circuit stated that Proffitt's attorney had improperly
read United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 929 (4th Cir. 1968), as holding that a psycho-
pathic or sociopathic personality was not sufficient to establish legal insanity. In Chandler,
the court considered the two appellants' appeals based on insanity. One appellant claimed
insanity on the basis of a "passive aggressive personality with alcoholic features." Id. at 922.
The second appellant appealed on the basis of a psychiatric report which diagnosed his
deficiency as a "sociopathic personality disturbance, antisocial type." Id. at 923. In affirming
the convictions of both appellants, the court confirmed its adherence to a two-pronged test
for insanity. Under this standard, a person is not criminally responsible if at the time he
commits a crime a mental disease or defect deprives him of the capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. However,
"the term 'mental disease or defect' do [sic] not include an abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct." Id. at 926. The court stated that the
test for insanity should not be mechanical but should allow for adaptation to suit the circum-
stances of each case. Id. at 927. The court inserted the caveat that in deciding the validity of
insanity pleas, the courts need not excuse all defendants who have psychiatric problems to
explain their deviant conduct. The presumption should be that anyone who has freedom of
will should be responsible for his actions before the law. Id.
The Proffitt court said that because of the availability of expert assistance, the defense
attorney should not have determined Proffitt's sanity within the meaning of Chandler. 582
F.2d at 858. What the Proffitt court did not recognize is that the legal definition of insanity
is often quite different from the medical definition. See WacHT, WATSON & POLLACK, supra
note 38 at 182. As a result, the assertion that the defense attorney, after having defended a
case using a similar defense, lacked the requisite knowledge to determine Proffitt's mental
competence, is questionable.
m See Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961). In Snider, the petitioner
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from defense attorney's failure to raise the
defense of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense. In the course of the habeas
corpus proceedings, two physicians testified that although defendant was neither psychotic
nor neurotic, his sexually abnormal behavior demonstrated a psychopathic personality disor-
der with an antisocial reaction. Despite the circuit court's holding that no evidence existed
suggesting the defendant incompetent to stand trial, the court nonetheless ruled that had the
physicians testified during trial the question of sanity would have reached the jury. The court
declined to declare the defendant's counsel ineffective since at the time of trial the defendant
insisted that he had not committed the crime.
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a pre-trial psychiatric report found that the defendant was of sound mind
but a post-trial examination revealed that he had suffered from a mental
disease since the time of the offense.89 In that situation the Fourth Circuit
found no denial of effective assistance since the attorney had reasonably
relied upon the results of a psychiatric examination to determine that an
insanity defense lacked merit." Proffitt, however, presented an entirely
different situation. According to the court, the failure of Proffitt's attorney
to assert the insanity defense resulted from the defendant's inability to
afford a psychiatric examination rather than from the questionable valid-
ity of the defense." The court stressed that the attorney's belief in the
likelihood of a successful insanity defense triggered his duty to request
additional assistance.2
While Judge Widener's dissent did not disagree with the abstract prin-
ciples of the majority, he took exception to the application of those princi-
ples to the facts of this case. 3 Working primarily from the record of the
district court, he interpreted the facts in a manner that would have af-
firmed the district court's judgment that Proffitt's representation had been
competent. The dissent focused on the fact that the possible change in the
attorney's status from appointed to retained had been the suggestion of the
defendant, not the attorney. 4 The defendant then asked whether anything
else could be done. The attorney responded that if certain psychiatrists
in Washington, D.C., were to examine him and if their reports were to find
Proffitt not responsible for his actions, then their reports might be pre-
sented as favorable evidence at the trial. For any chance of success,
however, the attorney said that the defense would have to take the govern-
ment by surprise so that no rebutting testimony could be presented. 7 The
dissent emphasized that the defendant initiated the conversation concern-
ing other potential defenses. Whereas the majority characterized the de-
fense attorney as agreeing to pursue a defense only if paid $10,000, the
"Id. at 684.
582 F.2d at 858.
I /d.
Id. at 858-59. Contra, id. at 860 (Widener, J., dissenting). See also Wilkins v. Mary-
land, 402 F. Supp. 76 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 327 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1044 (1977) (defendant has no constitutional right to examination by a psychiatrist of his own
choice).
In United States v. Matthews, 472 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1973), the Fourth Circuit estab-
lished the policy within the circuit that whenever practical the court ought to permit the
defendant to be examined by the psychiatrist of his own choice. United States v. Davis, 481
F.2d 425 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 977 (1973) clarified the ruling in Matthews on two
key points- First, the court implicitly confirmed that the policy in favor of appointing the
psychiatrist of defendant's choosing should not be construed as a constitutional right. Wilkins
v. Maryland, 402 F. Supp. at 80. Second, Davis held that the rule in Matthews was not
retroactive. Thus Proffitt, who was originally tried in 1971, could not benefit from the policy
articulated in Matthews. Id.







dissent contended that by his candor in responding to the defendant's
questions, the attorney may have been "too competent, but we should not
condemn him for it."
Despite the impression given by Satterfield and Proffitt, the Fourth
Circuit has not made a formal distinction in its rules between those cases
originating in federal court and those originating in state court. 8 The
Fourth Circuit's use of sweeping language concerning sixth amendment
requirements in Proffitt suggests the necessity of additional assistance for
an indigent defendant regardless of whether he is tried in state or federal
court. " The Fourth Circuit has required the assistance of a psychiatrist
"1 Two other recent Fourth Circuit habeas corpus cases indicate the court's direction in
applying the Marzullo standard. In Fuller v. Luther, 575 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1978), appellant
Fuller was convicted of robbery and in a writ of habeas corpus alleged ineffective assistance
of counsel on six grounds. Id. at 1099. The writ alleged that the defense counsel did not object
to testimiony concerning defendant's identification even though that identification, according
to Fuller, was fatally tainted with suggestiveness. Id. at 1100. Nor did the attorney object to
poice testimony concerning a statement made during the identification proceeding. Id. Fur-
thermore, the attorney presented no defense on behalf of the defendant. Id. Fuller also
contended that the attorney was drinking heavily during the trial. Id. at 1099. Finally, Fuller
alleged that the attorney never perfected an appeal because he was suffering from mental
illness. On appeal from a denial of the writ, the cirucuit court stated that Fuller had not met
his burden of proof on the allegation of ineffective assistance. Id. at 1106.
In Wood v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1978), the Commonwealth of Virginia
appealed the granting of a writ of habeas corpus by the district court. Wood v. Zahradnick,
430 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Va. 1977). Defendant Wood had been convicted of seven charges
stemming from the beating and rape of a sixty-seven year old woman. 578 F.2d at 981. The
Fourth Circuit faced the issue of when the right to effective assistance of counsel attaches.
Id. at 982. Wood's attorney apparently undertook no pre-trial preparation. The only defense
presented was that his client was addicted to heroin, had consumed large quantities of
moonshine whiskey on the night of the crime and had no recollection of the criminal acts.
Defense counsel made no attempt to seek a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant. Id. at
982. Had the attorney done so, he might have been able to construct an insanity defense based
upon alcoholic pathological intoxication. Id.
The court held that the defense attorney's assistance failed to measure up to the Marzullo
standard. Since insanity was the only plausible defense, failure to pursue the defense ren-
dered counsel ineffective. Furthermore, the court said that the attorney was not entitled to
rely upon his belief that Wood was not insane at the time of commission of the criminal acts.
Although the circuit court found no fault in the attorney's courtroom performance, it found
his preparation to be substandard. Hence, the court ruled that the right to reasonably compe-
tent counsel attaches at the moment an attorney is appointed to the defense of an accused.
Id. at 982.
" See Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965). Petitioner had pled guilty
to an indictment charging violation of the Internal Revenue laws relating to distilled spirits.
While in jail, he filed a writ of habeas corpus contesting his mental condition at the time of
his guilty plea. At a hearing to determine the defendant's mental capacity, the defense
counsel presented lay testimony that the defendant was a "Low Moron," and had previously
attempted suicide. Id. at 572.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that Jacobs had the right to a psychiatric examina-
tion. The court said that defendant's lack of expert assistance resulted only from his inability
to pay. Since the Criminal Justice Act was not in effect at the time, the court cited five
Supreme Court cases to support the statement that the Court has repeatedly held that
discrimination on the basis of poverty is intolerable in criminal proceedings. Id. at 573, citing
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v.
1979]
520 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
where no statute existed to make such additional assistance obligatory.' °°
The court justified this action on the abhorrence of the law for discrimina-
tion based on poverty'"' and on the necessity of a psychiatrist being tanta-
mount to the effective assistance of a lawyer.02 Thus, the Satterfield hold-
ing is inconsistent with the broader principles previously expressed by the
Fourth Circuit, and the case should be limited to its facts. Since Satter-
field had a legitimate reason for further psychiatric examination,'03 the
court's denial of additional assistance precluded Satterfield from obtaining
the quality representation demanded by the Fourth Circuit in past cases.
Although the Satterfield court did imply that a situation might arise in
which a request such as Satterfield's would be granted, the court's denial
of a request for raw information central to a colorable defense is difficult
to rationalize in light of previous Fourth Circuit decisions.
The Pro Se Right and Mid-Trial Dismissal of Appointed Counsel
In United States v. Dunlap,'4 the Fourth Circuit faced the issue of
whether the sixth amendment as interpreted in Faretta v. California'5
accords a defendant the right to make his own closing argument. 6 The
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Furthermore, the court made the unqualified statement that in
this situation the need for a psychiatrist's service was no less than the need for assistance of
counsel. 350 F.2d at 572-73; accord, United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 377 n.9 (4th Cir.
1971). The court said that the prison psychiatrist who examined the defendant was impartial
during the examination, but acted in an adversary capacity when on the stand as a prosecu-
tion witness, 350 F.2d at 573. But cf., Proctor v. Harris, 413 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (see
note 38, supra).
The Jacobs opinion does not limit its holding to federal courts. The logical implication
of Jacobs is that whenever an accused raises an insanity defense he is entitled to the aid of a
psychiatrist for the formation and presentation of his defense. Satterfield, however, reveals
that this is not the case. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra. Jacobs certainly is con-
trary to the argument implicit in Satterfield that a thorough examination satisfies all consti-
tutional requirements by giving the defense the information necessary for the preparation of
an effective case. 572 F.2d at 445.
'" Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965).
"o, Id. at 573.
o Id. at 572-73.
'0 See note 10, supra.
'° 577 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1978).
s" 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Faretta was charged by state authorities with grand theft. A
considerable time before his trial he requested permission of the court to present his own
defense. Id. at 807. Originally the court granted Faretta's request, but later withdrew it after
a judicially convened hearing at which the judge decided that Faretta's waiver of his right to
counsel had been neither knowing nor intelligent. Id. at 808. Following conviction and exhaus-
tion of state appellate remedies, Faretta appealed to the Supreme Court on sixth and four-
teenth amendment grounds. Id. at 807.
1N The Judiciary Act of 1789 was the original statutory provision for the pro se right, the
right to act as one's own counsel. That part of the Act is now codified in 28 U.S.C. §1654
(1976), which provides that "[I]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and
conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively,
are premitted to manage and conduct causes therein." See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 106 (1934) (sixth amendment guarantees right to cross-examine one's accusors); Adams
[Vol. XXXVI
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
court ruled that the right to deliver one's own closing argument is at the
trial judge's discretion. Absent abuse of that discretion, the appellate court
will not disturb the lower court's decision.10a
Dunlap involved the defendant's loss of confidence in his appointed
counsel. The attorneys had neglected to have a7 frivolous aiding and abet-
ting charge dismissed prior to trial,' 8 and had failed during the trial to
focus the jury's attention upon recurring discrepancies in the witnesses'
testimony. ' Dunlap's concern with his attorneys' performance induced
him to assert what he thought was his constitutional right to dismiss coun-
sel and make his own closing argument.
The Fourth Circuit based its refusal to permit the pro se closing argu-
ment on policy considerations. The court supported its holding by distin-
guishing Dunlap and Faretta. In Faretta the defendant moved to defend
his case pro se prior to trial and therefore had a constitutional right to act
as his own counsel."10 Dunlap, on the other hand, moved to proceed pro se
after the start of the trial. The circuit court held that because of the timing
of Dunlap's motion, the trial judge correctly exercised his discretion in
deciding that the situation did not warrant granting the defendant's mo-
tion."' The court stated that in making his decision, a trial judge should
consider factors such as minimization of disruption,"' avoidance of incon-
venience and delay,"3 maintenance of continuity,'" and comprehension by
the jury. ' Such considerations typify judicial trepidations about mid-
v. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (accused may waive right to counsel). See also Price v.
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948); Carter v. illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
Prior to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which held that the constitutional
right to pro se defense was applicable to state courts, the pro se right was recognized in the
constitutions of thirty-six states. Id. at 813. For the historical background of the pro se right,
see id. at 812-17.
,o 577 F.2d at 869.
,' Brief for Appellant at 19, United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1978).
1Id.
1,0 577 F.2d at 868-69.
' Id.; accord, United States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957); United
States v. Poster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976)
(defendant conducting own case is subject to rules of court).
"I See United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). In Foster, the defen-
dant, an attorney, requested to make his own closing argument. The judge denied the request
because of the defendant's violent outbursts during the trial. See also Note, 13 Am. Cmo. L.
REv. 335, 357 (1975).
113 Cf. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 936 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ormento v. United States, 397 U.S. 928 (1963) (right to counsel cannot be manipulated to
interfere with fair administration of justice); United States v. Abbamonte, 348 F.2d 700, 703-
04 (2d Cir. 1965) (upsetting judicial process by repeated dismissal of counsel may be inter-
preted as waiver of right to counsel; waiver must be viewed with judicial discretion). See also
Witt v. Nash, 342 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1965).
"I See Dearinger v. United States, 344 F.2d 309, 311 (9th Cir. 1965) (election to be
represented by counsel cannot be revoked without regard to impact upon the orderly adminis-
tration of justice); United States v. Birrell, 286 F. Supp. 885, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defendant
seeking mid-trial pro se assertion must show that prejudice resulting from denial of his pro
se request outweighs potential disruption of trial).
115 Cf. United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 908 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom.,
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trial pro se assertions and are the basis of the rule that the pro se right is
absolute only when asserted prior to trial."' The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that, due to the large body of case law existant prior to Faretta which held
that the defendant must assert the pro se right prior to trial,117 the timing
of the defendant's assertion remains a valid factual distinction even after
Faretta. "" Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Faretta did not alter
the status of the pro se right except to establish that the right is constitu-
tional rather than statutory."9
Despite the Dunlap court's adherence to generally accepted policy, the
court failed to relate these policy considerations to the facts of the case.
For reasons similar to those expressed in Dunlap, other courts generally
have denied mid-trial pro se assertions due to the defendant's unruliness
and apparent intent to disrupt the judicial process.' Neither the appellee
nor the court in Dunlap, however, mention any such unruliness or disrup-
tive intent on the defendant's part. Having given reasons for not granting
a pro se motion, the court neither said which of those reasons applied to
Dunlap nor supplied any guidelines which would lead to favorable consid-
eration of a pro se motion. Consequently, Dunlap offers little insight into
the Fourth Circuit's standards for a favorable mid-trial pro se assertion.
The Fourth Circuit regarded the petitioner's claim more as a disruption
Pegram v. United States, 400 U.S. 958 (1970) (granting or denying motion based on pro se
right after commencement of trial should take into account possibility of disruption of jury
trial).
I See, e.g., United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965);
Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1965); Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d
249, 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 838 (1963).
"I Under the majority rule the pro se right must be clearly and unequivocally asserted
prior to trial. See, e.g., McNamara v. Riddle, 563 F.2d 125, 126-27 (4th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976) (reason for
requirement of unequivocal assertion of pro se right is to be able to ascertain that waiver of
counsel was knowing and intelligent); United States ex rel. Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d
750, 754-56 (2d Cir. 1975) (trial court must make certain that unequivocal assertion of pro se
right and knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel have taken place to protect
against possible due process violation); United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 11-12 (9th Cir.
1975) (duty of trial court is to assure that decision to proceed pro se is competently and
intelligently made; trial judge should not direct defendant's case once pro se election made).
See also Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se in Criminal Proceedings, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q.
679, 688-689 (1973).
I' See Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976) (Faretta had no bearing
on rule that pro se right is sharply curtailed if not assetted prior to trial); People v. Windham,
137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 10, 560 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1977) (pro se right is unconditional only if invoked
within reasonable time prior to trial). Contra, Note, The Right to Pro Se: Faretta v. California
and Beyond, 40 ALo. L. REv. 423, 440 (1976) (Faretta suggests position that mid-trial pro se
assertion should not be denied except in extreme circumstances); Note, The Right to Defend
Pro Se in Criminal Proceedings, 37 OHIO ST. L. J. 220, 234 (1976) (suggesting that Faretta
repudiates judicial doctrine that pro se right must be asserted prior to trial); but cf., Chap-
man v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 893 n.13 (5th Cir. 1977) (conclusions of 37 OHIO ST. L.
J. at 234 are questionable).
I "I See 577 F.2d at 868; accord United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th
Cir. 1976).
"2 See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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of judicial efficiency than as an attempt to rectify possible ineffective
assistance of counsel."2 ' The court's fear of disruption becomes apparent
when the considerations articulated in Dunlap are compared with the rule
in the Second Circuit.2 2 The Second Circuit has stated, as among those
criteria for consideration of a mid-trial pro se ijiotion, "the reason foi the
request, the quality of the counsel representing the party, and the party's
proclivity to substitute counsel."'2 Therefore, the legitimacy of the defen-
dant's claim is the basis of decision on a mid-trial pro se assertion in the
Second Circuit. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Dunlap focused on ad-
ministrative efficiency and declined to scrutinize the reasoning of the trial
judge.
A factual rather than legal distinction was the basis of the Fourth
Circuit's rejection of the petitioner's claim that Faretta granted to defen-
dants the constitutional right to pro se assertion.1 2 4 Language in the Faretta
opinion supports the position of both the Fourth Circuit and the petitioner.
The Supreme Court reasoned that when the accused chooses to be repre-
sented by counsel, "law and tradition" give the attorney certain powers of
'' Brief for Appellant at 21, United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1978).
" See, e.g., Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1009-11 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusal of pro se
request proper where district court found that disagreement with attorney was over relatively
unimportant trial tactic, where attorney competent and defendant obstinate and where re-
quest followed multiple abortive counsel substitutions); United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d
491, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1003 (1969) (to grand midtrial pro se request,
defendant must show that legitimate interests outweight possible disruption; where defen-
dant dismissed attorney for no apparent reason then requested permission to argue pro se,
trial court did not err in refusing request); cf. United States v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 16 (2d
Cir. 1965) (where case called on calendar but jury not chosen, no possible disruption in
granting pro se request); see generally, United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 934-36 (2d
Cir. 1963); United States v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1945).
in Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976). In Sapienza, the defendant,
charged with forgery and larceny, would not discuss the case with his attorney. The court
denied the attorney's motion to be dismissed from the case because of the defendant's un-
cooperativeness. The motion was renewed and denied several more times. Id. at 1008. Toward
the end of the trial, the defendant made a pro se motion, apparently because he disagreed
with his attorney over which witnesses to subpoena. Id. at 1009. After conviction and exhaus-
tion of state remedies, the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. The district court denied the writ, and the Second Circuit affirmed, finding
that counsel had been effective. Id. The circuit court held that in addition to defendant's lack
of cooperation and decorum, the defendant had not demonstrated that his legitimate interest
in arguing pro se outweighed the disruptions which might ensue. Id. at 1010-11.
1u 577 F.2d at 869. The Dunlap court also held that according to the rule of United States
v. Lang, 527 F.2d 1264 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976), the district court
properly denied the defendant's motion to appear as co-counsel. Id. at 868. Although a broad
reading of Faretta might suggest that the sixth amendment confers upon the defendant the
right to have any representation he wishes, courts have refused to interpret Faretta in this
fashion. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1924-25 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976). For a substantial treatment of courts' reactions to hybrid
counsel attempts both before and after Faretta, see Note, The Accused Co-counsel: The Case
for the Hybrid Defense, 12 VAL. L. Rav. 329 (1978).
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decision over trial strategy.'2 Control by the attorney "can only be justi-
fied, however, by the defendant's consent, at the outset, to accept counsel
as his representative."'' 6 The language appears to give unequivocal support
to the Fourth Circuit's position. Conversely, the Faretta court also said
that the attorney is the "assistant" of the defendant,'12 and that thrusting
counsel upon the defendant violates the logic of the sixth amendment. 2
Representation by an unwanted attorney is a "tenuous and unacceptable
legal fiction"' ' since the defense presented is not that of the accused.',"
Certainly this language supports the petitioner's position in Dunlap. By
distinguishing the cases according to the time of the assertions, the Fourth
Circuit avoided consideration of whether representation by an unwanted
attorney amounts to a tenuous legal fiction when dissatisfaction with the
attorney arises after the start of trial. The soundness of the Fourth Cir-
cuit's factual distinction is questionable since the Supreme Court never
made that distinction itself,' despite the body of case law focusing on the
timeliness of the assertion. 32 Given the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's
opinion in relation to the Dunlap case, avoidance of a discussion of the
degree of applicability of Faretta to Dunlap is at least understandable.
The basis of the Dunlap decision is the Fourth Circuit's concern for the
implications of granting the petitioner's motion. By expressing broad pol-
icy considerations to the exclusion of the facts of the particular case, the
Dunlap court appears to have been preoccupied with the precedent that
would have been established by granting the petitioner's motion. Because
of the absence of allegations that the petitioner was disruptive or obstre-
perous during his trial, the Fourth Circuit's primary concern with court-
room order seems misplaced.'3 The criteria adopted by the Second Circuit
would have provided a more appropriate standard for the facts of this case
"1 422 U.S. at 820.
12 Id.




" Faretta discussed the time of assertion of the pro se right in the recitation of the facts,
id. at 806, and in the conclusory assertion that one indication of the knowing and intelligent
nature of Faretta's waiver was that it was made well in advance of the trial. Id. at 835. In
spite of the long-standing requirement that waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing
and intelligent, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), the Supreme Court has drawn
this traditional notion of waiver into question by holding that certain rights, if not actively
asserted, may have been waived. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 507-13 (1976) (defen-
dant who sat through trial in prison garb waived any due process violations arising there-
from). Estelle suggests that some rights require knowing and intelligent waivers while other
rights may be waived by non-assertion. Indeed, Estelle may be read to say that the right to
counsel is the only right which requires a knowing and intelligent waiver. Rosenberg,
Jettisoning Fay v. Noia, Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MiNN.
L. REv. 341, 385 (1978). Estelle implies that, absent some plain error, counsel's failure to
object to constitutional violations during trial precludes later assertion of the right on appeal.
Id. at 388.
' See note 117 supra.
2 See notes 121-23 and accompanying text supra.
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since the claim resulted from the petitioner's bona fide dissatisfaction with
his attorney.'3
The Defendant's Waiver of his Attorney's Conflict of Interest
In United States v. Duklewski,'1 the Fourth Circuit heard an interlocu-
tory appeal' 3 from a district court's denial of a motion to compel disclosure
of confidential material regarding an alleged conflict of interest of defense
counsel.' 37 The issue before the court was whether a complete denial of
access to information concerning the conflict of interest violated the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel of his own choice.'38
Allegations of conflict of interest'3 ' first arose at the defendant's pre-
'3 See note 123 supra.
1- 567 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1978).
Im An interlocutory appeal is an appeal from a decree which renders a final decision upon
some intervening matter relating to the cause of action. Taylor v. Breese, 163 F. 678, 684 (4th
Cir. 1908). The purpose of an interlocutory appeal is to give the defendant the opportunity
for relief from a decree which might affect his cause of action. Smith v. Vulcn Iron Works,
165 U.S. 518 (1897). The jurisdiction of circuit courts over interlocutory appeals originates in
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976).
For a detailed discussion of interlocutory appeals of disqualification orders, see Note,
Disqualification of Counsel for the Appearance of Professional Impropriety, 25 CATH. U. L.
Rav. 343, 346-49 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification]. The appealability of orders
of disqualification of counsel arises from the Supreme Court holding in Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The Court held that any order which was final but
neither a part of the original cause of action nor required for its disposition along with that
cause of action was appealable. Id. at 546-47. The Fourth Circuit has suggested that this may
be the proper method of appeal in disqualification orders. United States v. Hankish, 462 F.2d
316 (4th Cir. 1972). Accord, Tomlinson v. Florida Iron and Metal Inc., 291 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.
1961). Compare Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d
Cir. 1974) (Second Circuit will allow an immediate appeal of a disqualification order based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976)) with Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.
1973) (Second Circuit will hear interlocutory appeal from disqualification order as a matter
of common law.) See Disqualification, supra, at 348. Duklewski falls within the ambit of cases
concerning disqualification orders because, although the judge did not formally rule that he
had disqualified the attorney from the case, the Fourth Circuit held that the judge's conduct
amounted to a disqualification order. 567 F.2d at 257. The appealability of the trial judge's
determination comports with the rule in Cohen, supra, since the status of the defendant's
attorney is irrelevant to the merits of the case in chief.
1" 567 F.2d at 256.
I' See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1971); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1977); accord, United States v.
Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969).
' The reversability of a conviction due to conflict of interest is not subject to a uniform
standard. In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942), the Supreme Court con-
cluded that, absent a waiver, the court need only find that some prejudice resulted from the
conflict of interest to warrant a reversal of conviction. Several circuits have interpreted
Glasser to require the showing of actual prejudice to warrant reversal. See Ray v. Rose, 535
F.2d 966 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1026 (1976); United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Donatelli, 484 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Wis-
niewski, 478 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1973). Other circuits, however, require only a showing of
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trial conference on multiple counts of extortion and income tax evasion.'40
The government attorney told the district court judge that, because of the
nature of the information, an in camera ex parte'4' hearing might be appro-
priate to determine whether a conflict existed. Neither defendant nor de-
fense attorney was present at the hearing concerning the conflict of inter-
est.' The presiding judge concluded that it would be advisable for defense
counsel to disqualify himself, and subsequently the attorney withdrew
from the case.'
The court informed neither the defendant nor the defense counsel of the
basis of the conflict of interest upon which the court had relied.'44 The
defendant, in order to make a knowing waiver of his right to effective
assistance of counsel, moved for release of the information given to the
judge by the United States attorney.4 5 The government objected on the
grounds that release of the information would jeopardize investigations by
the United States attorney and a federal grand jury.'46 The government did
concede, however, that the defendant had a right to be told in "generic"' 4
terms the nature of the putative conflict. In ruling on the motion, the judge
refused to grant the government's consessions; instead, he held that the
government need not disclose to the defendant any information concerning
possible conflict of interest to warrant reversal. See United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport,
478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973); Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
,40 Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Duklewski, 567 F.2d 255 (1978).
, An in camera proceeding takes place in the judge's chambers. Brichreno v. Throp,
Jacob 300, 37 Eng. Rep. 864 (1821). In this country, the Constitution circumscribes the use
of in camera proceedings. The constitutional drawbacks of in camera determinations are that
they deprive the excluded party of the right to due process, violate the policy against secret
adjudication of an individual's rights, and rob the judicial process of its adversary nature. In
re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977). The Taylor court rationalized ex parte in camera
hearings as a means to resolve "the conflict between the threatened deprivation of a party's
constitutional rights and the government's claim of privilege based on the needs of public
security." Id. at 1188. Where the defense attorney is a possible target of an investigation and
the defendant invokes the fifth amendment to protect the attorney, the Second and Fourth
Circuits differ on resolution of this conflict between individual rights and the public's right
to know. The Fourth Circuit has held that the trial judge ought to disqualifiy the attorney.
In re Investigation before the February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir.
1977). The Second Circuit would use the federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. §6002 (1976).
In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1191 (2d Cir. 1977). The theory of the immunity statutes is that
in return for a waiver of his fifth amendment right to remain silent, the witness gains immun-
ity from prosecution based upon the inculpatory evidence which he provides. United States
v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
142 Although both the defendant and the attorney were notified of the hearing, they were
both specifically barred from the court. 567 F.2d at 256.




"I Id. at 257; being informed in "generic" terms means being informed as early as
possible of the apparent, inherent risks of the particular conflict of interest. See generally
United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d
1, 5 (1st Cir. 1972).
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the alleged conflict or its ramifications.' The defendant appealed the
judge's denial of his motion."'
The Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of denial of information from
the dual perspective of the abrogation of the defendant's rights and the
duties of the district court judge.'50 The court feasoned that although the
district court judge did not order the defense attorney to resign, his sugges-
tion that counsel withdraw was "coercive in effect."' 5 ' The court found that
such a suggestion, absent any information upon which the defendant could
base an intelligent waiver, amounted to a disqualification of the attor-
ney."12 Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court's ruling
denied the defendant his right to effective assistance of counsel of his own
choice.'53 The circuit court, therefore remanded the case to provide the
defendant with a proper hearing concerning the disqualification of his
attorney.'
54
The Duklewski court followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Garcia' as the standard to which judges should adhere in consid-
ering disqualification of attorneys for a conflict of interest.'58 The Garcia
"' 567 F.2d at 256.




' Id.; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S 458 (1938).
"' 572 F.2d at 257. Between the time of the denial of the defendant's motion and the
decision of the Fourth Circuit, information surfaced which, according to the circuit court
"might be regarded as adequate to guide the defendant in making a rational determination
[of] whether to waive his retained counsel's conflict." The circuit court's instructions on
remand were that the district court provide the defendant with all the information and
safeguards mandated under the Garcia test and then allow him to make his decision. Id. See
text accompanying notes 157-58 infra.
1- 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975). Garcia concerned the apparent conflict faced by attor-
neys who simultaneously represented the defendants and potential witnesses against the
defense. The defendants sought to keep their original counsel in spite of a district court order
to retain other attorneys. The defendants appealed, contending that they had knowingly and
intelligently waived their sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in favor of
representation by attorneys with an apparent conflict of interest. Id. at 274-75.
In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit initially discussed the appealability of
the district court's order in light of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949), see note 136 supra. Since the court order in Garcia concerned the status of the
defendants' attorneys and not the guilt or innocence of the defendants, the Fifth Circuit held
that although the disqualification was not a final judgment, deferral of appeal might jeopard-
ize the defendant's right to counsel of their choice. 517 F.2d at 275. The Garcia court then
analyzed the case from the perspective of the quality of the waiver required in a conflict of
interest case. The court reasoned that a waiver is "an intentional relinquishment of abandon-
ment of a known right." Id. at 276, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Furthermore the waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent, "with sufficient aware-
ness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 517 F.2d at 276, citing Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The court reasoned that a fundamental right might
be waived given that the waiver was proper. 517 F.2d at 276-77. See generally Note, Conflict
of Interests in Multiple Representation of Criminal Co-Defendants, 68 J. CRM. L. C. & P. S.
226 (1977).
"1 567 F.2d at 257 N.3., citing United States v. Mahar, 550 F.2d 1005, 1009 (5th Cir.),
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court held that the district court must determine the voluntariness of a
waiver according to the facts and circumstances of each case' 57 and that
the waiver must appear on the trial record.'58 The Fourth Circuit's reliance
on Garcia is important because Garcia provides that voluntariness is objec-
tively qualifiable. The Fifth Circuit stated seven requirements for a proper
waiver of a defendant's sixth amendment right to representation free from
conflict of interest. The district court must personally advise the defendant
of the perils of representation by counsel with a conflict of interest. 9 The
defendant must be able to question the court concerning the consequences
of continuing with an attorney who has a conflict of interest.10 The court
must try to "elicit a narrative response" from the defendant that he has
been advised of his sixth amendment rights; that he understands the de-
tails and inherent hazards of the conflict; that he has received legal advice
concerning his sixth amendment rights; and that he voluntarily waives
those rights."' Finally, the waiver must be established by clear, unequivo-
cal, and unambiguous language"2 and appear on the trial record.6 3
In light of the Fourth Circuit's acceptance of the Garcia standards, the
district court judge in Duklewski would have had to divulge sufficient
information concerning the federal investigation for the defendant to de-
termine whether his attorney could provide him with reasonably compe-
tent representation. 6 ' In addition, he would have had to elicit answers to
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977).
"T 517 F.2d at 277.
', Id. at 278; accord United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1972).
', 517 F.2d at 278.
Ia Id., accord United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); United States v.
Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972);
Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
"1 517 F.2d at 278. Particularly pertinent to the strength of the Garcia test is that all
conditions must be met before the waiver is certified as valid. Id. The Garcia court's attempt
to ensure as meaningful a waiver as possible is apparent from the requirement that the
defendant himself must articulate to the judge his understanding of the waiver which he is
executing. This standard is in marked contrast to Miranda warnings, in which the defendant
must only make affirmative or negative answers to either assert or waive his rights. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966). What Garcia does not set forth, and what
Duklewski does not address, is whether the defendant has the right to have an attorney
present during the waiver proceeding. Due process problems could arise in this setting, al-
though this issue does not yet seem to have arisen. Cf. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967) and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (establishing right to counsel at critical
stages).
II 517 F.2d at 278, citing National Equip. and Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
26 517 F.2d at 278. The Garcia court stipulated that the waiver must be executed in the
same manner as a waiver under F.R. CRum. P. 11(d) which states:
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by
addressing the defendant personally and in open court, determining that the plea
is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea
agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether defendant's willingness to
plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney
for the government and the defendant or his attorney.
I" See Ray v. Rose, 491 F.2d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1974) (standard of reasonably competent
[Vol. XXXVI
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
the questions set forth in Garcia."5 The judicial role would focus on the
defendant's knowledge of his sixth amendment rights and the subsequent
establishment on the record of the defendant's intelligent waiver.166 Thus,
a suggestion to the defense attorney to resign without discussion with the
defendant is impermissible."7
The Fourth Circuit, in adopting the Garcia test, imposes on its prior
case law'66 a specific standard for the judge to apply when he believes that
a defense attorney's conflict of interest might hinder the quality of the
defendant's representation. The test is a procedural tool by- which the
circuit court can determine whether the defendant and the district court
have fully explored and exhausted the necessary elements of a sixth
amendment waiver.'69 At the district court level, the Garcia test would
seem to safeguard the defendant's right to unfettered representation79 by
making the defendant articulate his understanding of both the sixth
amendment and his attorney's conflict of interest.'' The strength of the
assistance demands defendant's awareness of circumstances of his counsel's conflicts).
"1 567 F.2d at 257.
I See Gray v. Estelle, 574 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1978) (no waiver is valid without
participation and approval of trial judge); United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 104 (8th Cir.
1977) (meaningful inquiry into defendant's waiver helps both defense and prosecution be-
cause exposure of possible conflict of interest decreases chance of prejudicial error, and
establishes record for appeal showing that, despite conflict, defendant chose that attorney);
United States v. Mahar, 550 F.2d 1005, 1010 (5th Cir. 1977) (when defendant opposes disqual-
ification of his attorney, district court must take necessary steps to impart to defendant full
understanding of decision and seek to honor defendant's ultimate choice).
"7 567 F.2d at 257.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Hankish, 462 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1972); Kelly v. Peyton, 420 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1969); Sawyer
v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966); Reickauer v. Cunningham, 299 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.
1962).
" Cf. United States v. Hankish, 462 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1972) (discerning how informal
waiver should be considered for purposes of appeal).
170 Cf. Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966) (actual conflicts need not be shown
to void conviction); see generally Glasser v. United United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
"1 572 F.2d at 355. Other circuits have adopted tests based on the same standards as
those articulated in Garcia. See United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. .Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972); Campbell v. United States,
352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The circuits agree that the right to counsel of one's choice is
neither absolute nor unqualified. See, e.g., United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1180 (3d
Cir. 1978); In re Investigation before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652
(4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998
(1976); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976). A court exercising its inherent power to
regulate an attorney's professional conduct may disqualify retained counsel or refuse to ac-
cept the defendant's waiver of his attorney's conflict. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.
1976); accord, Ceramco Inc. v. Lee Pharm., 510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975); Saier v. State Bar,
293 F.2d 756 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 947 (1961). In order for the court to dismiss an
attorney outright, however, the conflict of interest must be actual rather than potential.
United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d at 1180-83, citing Greer, Representation of Multiple Crimi-
nal Defendants: Conflicts of Interests and the Professional Responsibility of the Defense
Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REv. 119 (1977).
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Duklewski approach lies in its balance of defendants' rights and judicial
integrity. The objective test adopted by the Fourth Circuit is a desirable
refinement of the former amorphous standards."' The defendant will bene-
fit because either he will understand his attorney's potential conflict and
proceed in spite of it or he will receive conflict-free representation. Further-
more, the Garcia procedure establishes a record from which the appellate
court may make a more informed decision.
ERIc H. SCHLESS
D. Search and Seizure
Warrantless Search of Parolee's Home
While the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and sei-
zures,' the validity of a search and seizure is often uncertain 2 because
"reasonable" is a broad standard that may depend on numerous factors.
Search warrant procedures have been formulated, however, that allow a
more convenient determination of reasonableness than simple reliance on
the broad term that appears in the fourth amendment. Warrants to search
and seize may issue only on probable cause3 as determined by a neutral
and detached magistrate.4 The warrant requirement has supplanted the
reasonableness standard to such a degree that warrantless searches and
seizures are per se unreasonable,5 subject to exceptions, based on exigency,,
officer safety,8 destruction of evidence,9 and impracticality." The exclu-
172 See note 168 supra.
The fourth amendment reads in relevant part that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend IV.
2 See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MNN. L. Rsv.
349 (1974); LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law. .. Has Not... Run
Smooth", 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see notes 84 & 114 infra.
See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 (1971); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964);
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960).
1 "Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house,
furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant." Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615-16 (1961). But
see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970). The Supreme Court has expressed a strong
preference for searches with warrants. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 (1965).
The same is true of warrants for arrest. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); see notes 7-10 infra.
The mobility exception to the warrant requirement was first outlined in Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Court, recognizing that police cannot obtain a
warrant to stop a car, upheld warrantless searches of automobiles when probable cause and
exigent circumstances are present. Id. at 162; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
A warrantless search may be made incident to a valid arrest. Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969). The purpose of this exception is to prevent the arrestee from obtaining an
easily accessible weapon or from concealing or destroying evidence close at hand. Id. at 763.
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sionary rule" forbids the use at trial of all evidence acquired in an illegal
search or seizure.
Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, police may search the area "within his
[arrestee's] immediate control." Id.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), develop
the notion of forcible stop and frisk by an investigating policeman. These limited warrantless
intrusions are justifiable on a mere "reasonable suspicion," which is less than probable cause.
407 U.S. at 146; 392 U.S. at 27; see note 86 infra; text accompanying notes 96-101 & 117-20
infra.
The doctrine that evidence in plain view may be seized is explained in Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) and clarified in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
465-71 (1971). Prerequisites for this exception are that the seizing officer must rightfully be
at the vantage point, the discovery must be inadvertent, and the incriminating nature of the
evidence must be immediately apparent. 403 U.S. at 468-70. See also United States v. Diaz,
577 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1978).
A warrant is unnecessary when police are in hot pursuit of a suspect. Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S, 294, 298-300 (1967). Under such circumstances, police may search both the suspect
and his home, and all evidence obtained during such a search is admissible. Id. ,
10 A limited exception to the warrant requirement exists in the case of border searches.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973); Carroll v. United States,'267
U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1967). At
national boundaries, the warrant requirement is waived, and all prospective entrants may be
forced to submit to an investigatory stop including n identification check dnd a search. 413
U.S. at 272, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
A citizen may consent to a waiver of his fourth amendment rights. Schneckloth v. Busts-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973). Consent may sometimes be given by third parties, United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 168-71 (1974), but it must always be given freely and
voluntarily. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973);'Bumper v. North Caro-
lina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). Parolees may expressly and impliedly give blanket consent to
warrantless searches of their persons and homes. See note 15 infra.
Generally, when a property owner does not give consent, warrants are required for admin-
istrative inspection searches by health, safety, and fire inspectors. In such cases, however,
the requisite showing of probable cause is diminished. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.'
523, 534-39 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). Exceptions to this general rule'
exist when special types of inspections are involved, necessitating frequent unannounced
searches by inspectors to exercise effectively the degree of control anticipated by Congress.
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (interpreting § 923 of the Gun Control Act
as allowing firearms inspectors to make limited warrantless searches pursuant to compila-
tions of ordinances furnished firearms dealers under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (1976)); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (holding Congress may approve such
inspections under liquor laws as necessary for effective enforcement).
1 The exclusionary rule bars evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution from
criminal proceedings. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 399 (1914). But see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975) (allowing use
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence to impeach defendant's testimony). The rule has a
dual purpose; compelling police observance of the constitutional rights of private citizens
through adherence to constitutional restraints on the gathering of evidence, and preserving
judicial integrity by refusing to convict suspects on the basis of illegally obtained evidence.
367 U.S. at 654. Fourth amendment rights are enforceable against the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 655.
The exclusionary rule has come under considerable attack from members of the Supreme
Court who call for legislative creatiQn of an alternative to the rule. The Chief Justice has been
one of its severest critics:
[lit now appears that the continued existence of the [exclusionary] rule, as
19791
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The validity of searches of parolees is particularly troublesome.'2 While
parole is not a recent innovation in our criminal justice system,'3 the extent
of a parolee's fourth amendment rights," the validity of blanket waivers
of those rights,'" and the degree of probable cause necessary to search paro-
presently implemented, inhibits the development of rational alternatives. The rea-
son is quite simple: Incentives for developing new procedures or remedies will
remain minimal or non-existent so long as the exclusionary rule is retained in its
present form.
It can no longer be assumed that other branches of government will act while
judges cling to this Draconian, discredited device in its present absolutist form.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (1976) (Burger, C. J., concurring).
For commentary on current application of the exclusionary rule, see generally Gilday,
The Exclusionary Rule: Down and Almost Out, 4 N. Ky. L. Rav. 1 (1977); Kamisar, Mondale
on Mapp, 3 Civ. LiB. REV. 62 (February-March, 1977); Williams, Institute on Exceptions to
the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 29 OKLA. L. Rav. 659 (1976); Note,
The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation: A Policy Reappraisal, 54 TEx.
L. REv. 1115 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Policy Reappraisal].
12 Compare United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966) and Tamez v. State,
534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) with United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir.
1978) and People v. Mason, 5 Cal.3d 759, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630, cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1016 (1971). See generally Note, Probation Conditions, 1 AM. J. CmM. LAw 235 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Probation Conditions]; Note, Warrantless Searches of Parolees, 69 J.
CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 372 (1978); Comment, The Search and Seizure Condition of Proba-
tion: Supervisory or(Unconstitutional?, 22 S.D. L. REv. 199 (1977).
13 The notion of parole was developed in the United States at the Elmira, New York,
correctional facility in 1877. C. NEWMAN, SOURCEaOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDON 33
(3d Ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as NEwMAN].
'" In one of its few rulings in the area of parolee consitutional rights the Supreme Court,
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), held that parolees have fourteenth amendment
due process rights and are entitled to a hearing before revocation of parole. Id. at 482-89. After
Morrissey, courts have consistently held parolees have some fourth amendment rights; how-
ever, the courts have almost universally held that parolees' fourth amendment rights do not
extend as fully as ordinary citizens' rights. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074,
1075 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 987 (1975); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1971); Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Alas. 1977);
Croteau v. State, 334 So.2d 577, 579 (Fla. 1976). But see United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d
787, 789 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 1966); State v.
Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970) (holding parolee's
fourth amendment rights are not different from those of other citizens).
" The validity of blanket waivers of parolee fourth amendment rights has been upheld
in People v. Mason, 5 Cal.3d 759, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630 (1971); People v. Fortunato,
50 App. Div. 2d 38, 43, 376 N.Y.S.2d 723, 728 (1975); State v. Mitchell, 22 N.C. App. 663,
665, 207 S.E.2d 263, 264 (1974); State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136, 139 (N.D. 1972).
Provisions in a parole agreement that specifically waive the constitutional right to be
secure against warrantless searches have been upheld in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales,
521 F.2d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1975). But see People v. Bremmer, 30 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 106
Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 (1973); People v. Peterson, 62 Mich. App. 258, 265, 233 N.W.2d 250, 255
(1975); Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). See generally Note,
Constitutional Law-Probation Searches-Probation Condition Requiring Probationer's
Consent to Searches By Any Law Enforcement Officer at Any Time or Place Is Unconstitu-
tional, 8 TEx. TECH. L. Rav. 497 (1976) (Commentary on Tamez).
A blanket waiver is invalid if consent is found not to be freely and voluntarily given.
Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1156-57 (W.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Schneckloth v.
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lees' homes in the absence of express waivers"6 still raise difficult issues.
The Fourth Circuit recently considered, in United States v. Bradley,
17
whether a parole officer's warrantless searches of a parolee's home violated
the fourth amendment." The court addressed the narrow question of
whether a parole officer needed a warrant to search a parolee's home when
probable cause existed but exigent circumstances did not. 9 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that parolees have the same fourth amendment rights
as ordinary citizens and therefore the warrant requirement applies to paro-
lee searches. Since the prerequisites for a valid warrantless search were not
met and a warrant was not obtained, the search in Bradley was invalid"
and all evidence obtained as a result should have been excluded from
trial. 21
As a parole condition, defendant Bradley consented to unannounced
warrantless visitation by his parole officer, but not to warrantless searches
of his home. His landlady informed the parole officer that Bradley had a
loaded firearm in his room, in violation of his parole agreement.Y Six hours
after receiving this information, the officer searched the room without a
warrant and seized the gun. The firearm was admitted as evidence during
Bradley's trial and a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm re-
sulted.2
On appeal, the government argued not. that convicted criminals re-
leased on parole have no fourth amendment rights but that parole officers
stand in a special position, holding parolees in constructive custody.24 Con-
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (voluntariness of consent must be apparent from
the totality of the circumstances, and is negated by coercion); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967).
" Some courts have allowed a search based only on a suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975);
State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 84, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1973). Other courts have held
probable cause is needed since a parolee's fourth amendment rights are identicial with those
of other citizens. State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 540 (Iowa 1970); State v. Culbertson, 29
Or. App. 363, 563 P.2d 1224, 1227-29 (1977).
'7 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 788.
" Probable cause alone, though sufficient to obtain a warrant, is not ordinarily sufficient
justification for a warrantless search. Vale v. Louisianna, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970). See also
notes 6-10 supra & note 86 infra.
21 571 F.2d at 790.
22 Id.; see note 8 supra.
2 571 F.2d at 788.
" Id. The federal statute under which Bradley was convicted prohibits possession of a
firearm by one previously found guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976).
24 571 F.2d at 789. The argument that parole officers stand in a special position, holding
parolees in constructive custody, was based on the Ninth Circuit's holding in Latta v. Fitzhar-
ris, 521 F.2d 246 (1975). See also United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 453 (1976).
The constructive custody line of reasoning is based on the original notions of parole, when
premature release of a prisoner was allowed in the custody of a "next friend." NEWMm, supra
note 13, at 17-37. According to the constructive custody theory, the role of next friend is now
played by the parole officer, who must be allowed, when supervising his charge, wider consti-
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sequently, when a parole officer has probable cause to conduct a search,
he may do so without a warrant. The prosecution argued by analogy to
Latta v. Fitzharris where the constructive custody theory was used to
justify a warrantless search of a parolee's home. The validity of the search
in Latta was based on a perceived special relationship between a parolee
and his parole officer which gave rise to a theory of constructive custody."6
The Fourth Circuit rejected the government's constructive custody ar-
gument, holding that the officer-parolee relationship does not justify an
infringement of a parolee's fourth amendment rights. 2 The court, stating
that the special relationship and the interests of society serve only to
diminish the standard of probable cause needed to obtain a warrant, disal-
lowed the warrantless search. 2s Parole officers must obtain a warrant to
search a parolee's residence unless an established exception to the warrant
requirement applies." The court considered existing exceptions and found
none applicable to the facts in Bradley.30
In holding that the warrant requirement extends to parole officer
searches of a parolee's home, the Fourth Circuit assumed that parolees
have fourth amendment rights.3 1 Some circuits, including the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Latta, have found that parolees have no fourth amendment rights
whatever while others have found parolees have diminished fourth amend-
ment rights.32 The Fourth Circuit's decision, relying on the dissent in
tutional latitude than a police officer working in the field. The parole officer has the power
of revoking parole in a summary proceeding if reasonable cause can be shown.
521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
28 Id. The Ninth Circuit's decision relied in part on California state court decisions
establishing precedent for the validity of the "special relationship." Id. at 250-51; see People
v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 471, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 (1975); People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d
759, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630 (1971); People v. Henandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40
Cal. Rptr. 100 (3d Dist. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). See also Probation Condi-
tions, supra note 12 (commentary on Mason); Note, Extending Search-and-Seizure Protec-
tion to Parolees in California, 22 STAN. L. REv. 129 (1969) (commentary on Hernandez).
1 571 F.2d at 789-90. See also Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1975)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (arguing parole officers should not be allowed to infringe on
parolees' fourth amendment rights). A parole officer may visit the parolee at any time,
pursuant to visitation agreements. The parole officer has the same power to conduct warrant-
less searches as police officers; see notes 7-10 supra, consequently he has tools for effective
supervision and reduced fourth amendment rights are unnecessary. See also note 34 infra.
571 F.2d at 790.
Id. at 789-90.
Id. at 790.
2, The government did not dispute defendant's contention that the fourth amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to parolees. 571 F.2d at 789
n.2.
See e.g., People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149-50, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104
(3d Dist. 1964); People v. Santos, 368 N.Y.S.2d 130, 137-38 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown,
240 Pa. Super. Ct. 190, 192-93, 361 A.2d 846, 848-49 (1976). Four distinct theories have been
upheld in other jurisdictions to justify withholding fourth amendment coverage from paro-
lees: "constructive custody," see text accompanying notes 24-29 supra, "contract," see note
15 supra, "incarceration" and "grace." See generally Note, Probation Conditions-To Re-
quire a Probationer to Submit Himself to Search and Seizure at Any Time By Any Law
Enforcement Officer Is Not an Unreasonable Invasion of Fourth Amendment Rights, 1 Am.
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Latta, found the denial of parolee's fourth amendment rights unconstitu-
tional 3 and unnecessary.34 Instead, the court held that parolees are entitled
to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 Recognizing that a
search warrant must be obtained, the court stated that probable cause is
more easily established against parolees,"6 making procurement easier."
An officer has probable cause when sufficient evidence exists to con-
vince a reasonable man that it is more probable than not that the evidence
sought relates to criminal activity and that those same items will be found
in the area to be searched." For the most part, this standard appies to
searches with or without warrants. Several search situations exist, how-
ever, when a standard less than that of probable cause applies. The admin-
J. CrmM. L. 235 (1972); Note, Striking the Balance Between Privacy and Supervision: The
Fourth Admendment and Parole and Probation Officer Searches of Parolees and
Probationers, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 800 (1976).
3 571 F.2d at 789. A blanket waiver of protection from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures is "so repugnant to the whole spirit of the Bill of Rights as to make it alien to the essence
of our form of government." People v. Peterson, 62 Mich. App. 258, 266, 233 N.W.2d 250,
255 (1975). This view is generally accepted. See, e.g., People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 182-
83, 371 N.E.2d 794, 798, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 35 (1977) (even though prisoners have no constitu-
tional right to parole, legislative grace in granting parole does not justify forced agreement
to unconstitutional provisions).
u 571 F.2d at 789. Diminished constitutional protection is not necessary to the govern-
ment's interest in supervision because the parole system already provides sufficient mecha-
nisms. Since a parole officer is allowed to make investigatory visits at will, a framework exists
allowing warrantless searches when necessary. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 254-59
(9th Cir. 1975) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cited in 571 F.2d at 789. The parole officer has
no problem gaining access to a parolee's room where the parole agreement contained a provi-
sion specifying that the parolee must submit to unannounced visits by his parole officer as
in Bradley. 571 F.2d at 789. The acceptance of the validity of this intrusion into a parolee's
privacy is universal. See, e.g., Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1242 (Alas. 1977).
These visits would probably be upheld as analogous to administrative visits which re-
quire no warrant because of their special nature. 571 F.2d at 789; see United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972) (warrantless inspection pursuant to the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(19) (1969) is constitutional); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (warrantless,
unannounced visit by a welfare caseworker constitutional). If the parole officer's suspicion is
aroused, he can look around and question the parolee. See note 9 supra. Evidence in plain
view may be seized. See, e.g., Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Alas. 1973). If probable
cause is aroused by events in the course of the visit, exigency may permit an immediate
search. See note 14 supra. Thus, no need exists to extend unbridled search power to the parole
officer since existing exceptions to the warrant requirement allow him to search whenever he
has both probable cause and exigency, or sees evidence of a crime in plain view. 571 F.2d at
790.
571 F.2d at 789.
14 Id. at 790.
7 Id.
-- See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 158-59 (1925); See also Comment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961). Probable cause for
an arrest requires a showing that a certain crime was committed by a certain named individ-
ual. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
39 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964). Probable cause determined by a magis-
trate, however, may be based on evidence less judicially competent than evidence used by a
police officer to justify a warrantless search. Id. at 111. See also United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 417-18, 423 (1976).
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istrative search" and the "stop and frisk"4 are examples. Probable cause
is not necessary for either intrusion. To obtain a warrant for an administra-
tive search for fire, safety and health inspections, an officer need only show
that legislative or administrative search standards have been formulated,
and that they apply to the building being searched." In "stop and frisk"
searches, the standard for probable cause is diminished to a "reasonable
suspicion," based on articulable facts available to the officer at the time
that a crime has taken place. The Fourth Circuit decided that a reduced
standard of probable cause would uphold a parole officer's search of a
parolee's home, with or without a warrant, but did not decide to what
extent the probable cause requirement should be diminished."
If several facts had been different, the court might have upheld the
warrantless search of the defendant's room on the basis of the exigent
circumstances exception,45 but the court considered the six hours elapsed
between the complaint and the search sufficient time to obtain a warrant."
Because no other existing exception would apply to the Bradley facts, a
warrant was necessary to uphold the search."7
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Bradley, although progressive when
compared with similar holdings in other circuits," accords with Supreme
Court decisions in other areas of procedural rights for parolees." The
Fourth Circuit's view of fourth amendment rights for parolees is out of step
with other circuits only to the extent that Bradley leads a universal trend
toward bestowing more constitutional rights on parolees and probationers"
by applying the same procedural requirements as used in the case of an
ordinary citizen.
One possible result of Bradley's grant of full fourth amendment rights
to probationers and parolees could be the application of the exclusionary
rule to probation and parole revocation hearings. A conflict' between two
10 See note 10 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 96-101 & 117-20 infra; note 8 supra.
,2 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).
13 See generally text accompanying notes 99-101 infra.
11 571 F.2d at 788 n.1. Defendant did not dispute that the parole officer had probable
cause and the facts would have supported a finding of the requisite probable cause for a
warrant to search the defendant's room under either the usual or diminished standard. Id.
,5 See note 7 supra.
41 571 F.2d at 790.
47 Id.
' See text accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
' Parolees have fourteenth amendment due process rights. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 482 (1972); see note 14 supra. Parolees have a right to counsel when a lawyer's assistance
is needed to guarantee the "effectiveness of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey." Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).
See generally United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976); Latta v. Fitzhar-
ris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975); Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1218
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1971); Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.
N.Y. 1975).
, The cases holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to parole or probation revocation
proceedings are legion. See note 71 infra.
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trends becomes apparent because while the constitutional rights of paro-
lees and probationers have been expanding,52 the exclusionary rule has
been increasingly criticized and re-evaluated, resulting in its curtailment
and threatened abolition. 4 All other circuits prior to Bradley have found
the rule inapplicable to parole and probation proceedings." In contrast, the
Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Workman,5 held that evidence ob-
tained by a probation officer in violation of the fourth amendment should
be suppressed from probation revocation proceedings.
Workman was on probation following conviction for possession of a
distillery and bootleg whiskey. - His probation officer received information
of a still in Workman's storage shed, conducted a warrantless search of that
building, and found evidence of criminal conduct which was in violation
of the probation agreement. Exigent circumstances which would justify
failure to obtain a warrant were not present at the time of the search."
Nevertheless, the district court admitted the evidence in Workman's pro-
bation revocation hearing." The Fourth Circuit vacated the revocation
order for further proceedings consistent with their holding that the war-
rantless search violated Workman's fourth amendment rights and that the
evidence seized during the warrantless search should have been sup-
pressed."
The government argued that the search was valid either under an ex-
ception to the administrative search requirement" or under the broad sta-
tutory authority granted by Congress to probation officers.' The prosecu-
tion asserted that such evidence, though inadmissable for initial determi-
nation of guilt in criminal proceedings, ought to be admissable in proba-
tion revocation proceedings. The government argued that applying the
52 See note 50 supra.
0 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-90 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 447 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974). See also note 11
supra.
m In his concurring opinion in Stone v. Powell the Chief Justice voiced harsh criticism
of the rule. 428 U.S. at 500-02 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see note 11 supra.
55 See note 71 infra. But cf. Policy Reappraisal, supra note 11 at 1117-21 (advocating
extension of the rule).
" United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1206-07.
5 Id. at 1207.
Id. at 1207-11.
Id. at 1207-08. The general rule is that a warrant must always be obtained to make a
search of premises, even for an administrative inspection. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 531-33 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967); see note 10 supra.
The government argued for expansion of the narrow exception to that general rule outlined
in Colonnade and Biswell. See note 10 supra. However, the Fourth Circuit followed recent
Supreme Court guidance in holding thd Colonnade-Biswell exception inapplicable to the facts
in Workman. See United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787,789 (4th Cir. 1978); text accompany-
ing notes 29-30 supra.
"2 "At any time within the probation period, the probation officer may for cause arrest
the probationer wherever found, without a warrant." 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1969). Nothing in the
statute, however, allows probation officers to make warrantess searches.
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exclusionary rule to revocation hearings might destroy the effectivenss of
the parole and probation systems,13 and advocated that the rule not be
applied to revocation hearings absent a demonstration of police harass-
ment. 4
The Fourth Circuit used the Supreme Court's test 5 for determining the
applicability of the exclusionary rule and reasoned that the harm which
non-exclusion would have caused to the probationer outweighed any possi-
ble harm to the parole and probation systems."6 The court recognized that
revocation hearings may result in a loss of liberty so that the injury and
benefit potential of probation revocation hearings is the same as for other
criminal proceedings. The Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
has never failed to apply the exclusionary rule to an adjudicative proceed-
ing where unconstitutionally obtained evidence is offered "in direct sup-
port of a charge that may subject the victim of a search to imprisonment"' S
and concluded that evidence procured in violation of a probationer's con-
stitutional rights could not be admitted in a revocation hearing. 9
Although recent Supreme Court decisions have consistently limited the
application of the exclusionary rule,7" the Court has never resolved the
question of the applicability of the rule to parole or probation revocation
hearings. The circuit courts have uniformly held, however, that the exclu-
sionary rule is inapplicable to parole and probation revocation hearings."
0 585 F.2d at 1208-09; accord, United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir.
1975); Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 240
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp.
648 (E.D. La. 1970), affl'd, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1971).
Courts have held also that applying the rule only in determinating guilt or innocence
optimally discourages illegal law enforcement activity. United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817
(7th Cir. 1971); Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
11 United States v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1978), citing United States v.
Brown, 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973). An even stricter standard, that the exclusionary rule is
appropriate only in a case where police misconduct shocks the conscience, was set out in State
v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 914 (Alas. 1976); cf. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th
Cir. 1975).
,1 In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Supreme Court considered
whether or not the exclusionary rule applied to grand jury proceedings. Id. at 348-55. The
Court, striking a balance between potential injury to the proceeding and potential benefits
of application, refused to extend the rule. Id. at 354-55. The Court found that exclusion of
evidence would hinder the grand jury process as well as impose needless double application,
since use of the rule at trial is sufficient to protect the constitutional rights of a criminal
defendant. Id. at 354.
585 F.2d at 1209-11.
' Id. at 1209-10. Whether Workman is convicted of criminal charges or his probation




,' See generally Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1964);
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STA L. REv. 1027 (1974); Schrock & Welsh,
Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L.
REV. 251 (1974); Comment, 22 Lov. L. REV. 856 (1976); Policy Reappraisal, supra note 11.
1, See, e.g., United States v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
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In light of the trend in other circuits, the Workman decision, holding the
rule applicable to a probation revocation hearing and suppressing evidence
unlawfully seized by a probation officer, is unusual
The exclusionary rule has never been interpreted as a proscription of
all unconstitutionally procured evidence from all proceedings against all
people.72 Use of the rule in parole or probation revocation proceedings has
been held to be detrimental to the parole or probation process. 73. Some
courts have found that application of the rule hampers the rehabilitation
possible in the probation system by making the probation officer's job
more difficult and by diminishing the court's ability to assess a proba-
tioner's progress.74 The Supreme Court has set out a balancing test for
determining whether the exclusionary rule is appropriately applied to pro-
ceedings other than the initial determination of guilt in criminal trials.
7
The benefits of the exclusionary rule are weighed against the impairment
to the proceedings that exclusion of the unconstitutionally seized evidence
might cause. If the goal of deterrence of police misconduct would be ad-
vanced only minimally and the proceeding in question would be greatly
burdened, then the rule should not be used.
7
The Fourth Circuit balanced the benefits of exclusion against the im-
pairment to the proceedings and concluded that the exclusionary rule
should be applicable in probation revocation hearings. 7 The court relied
on its reasoning in Bradley, that parolees have full fourth amendment
rights, 8 to hold that the rule carries the same injury-benefit potential in
revocation proceedings as in criminal prosecutions. 79 The Workman deci-
sion, which rejected the reasoning that use of the exclusionary rule may
Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 53 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir.
1975); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1971); Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426
F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Cates, 402 F.2d 473,474 (4th Cir. 1968); Hyser
v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 236 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
71 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d
834, 838 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975). The exclusionary rule was adopted to
protect fourth amendment rights by mandating that evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the abuse. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). It was designed to
prevent future unlawful police conduct, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), but its
use has been restricted to areas where deterrent objectives are best served. United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
13 United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d
94 (5th Cir. 1973); Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
7 United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94, 95 (9th Cir. 1975)..The supervising officer will
be hampered in his task of revoking probation from convicts who should still be in jail, and
the officer also will be burdened with finding admissable evidence in order to convince a judge
that a convicted criminal should no longer be allowed the luxury of serving his sentence on*
the streets. Id.
,1 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
7, See United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d at 94-95.
" 585 F.2d at 1209-10. Additional justification was found in the fact that revocation
proceedings are commonly used as a substitute for criminal prosecution. Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1207.
, Id. at 1210-11.
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injure the parole system is contrary to an extensive body of case law in
other circuits." The Fourth Circuit's expansion of the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule comes at a time when the Supreme Court has been limiting
exclusion in a variety of areas."' The Fourth Circuit may have felt that
since Bradley gave parolees full fourth amendment rights, Workman
should apply the exclusionary rule to parole and probation proceedings to
give substance to those rights. The Workman holding, however, is not a
necessary corollary to the Bradley decision since the exclusionary rule is
not a mandatory element of full fourth amendment rights. 2 Even citizens
with no criminal record receive no benefit from the rule in grand jury or
warrant proceedings. 3 The Fourth Circuit apparently applied the rationale
of the exclusionary rule without recognizing that its application has been
limited to a few selected areas as a deterrent to unconstitutional police
activity.84 The court's holding in Workman was not necessitated by its
holding in Bradley and therefore does not cast doubt on the validity of
Bradley.
Stop and Frisk
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Gorin, considered a search and
seizure which fell under the stop and frisk exception to the warrant require-
ment. The issue specifically raised was whether an investigative stop was
lawfully made when based on a tip from an informant of untested reliabil-
ity. As a general rule, the fourth amendment forbids area searches or
custodial arrests without a warrant supported by a showing of probable
cause.88 In order to obtain a warrant the searching or arresting officer must
See notes 72-73 supra.
" See note 53 supra. Another indication of the trend toward limiting the exclusionary
rule is in ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures § SS 290.2 (1975). Under the Model
Code, only evidence procured by means of substantial violations of the Code, which are found
to be gross, willful and prejudicial to the accused, warrants suppression. Id. § SS 290.2(2),
(3). In determining substantiality, circumstances considered are: how unlawful and willful
the violation was as well as the extent to which privacy was invaded, whether exclusion will
discourage further violation of the Code, whether the seized items would have been discovered
in any event, and the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability to
defend himself. Id. at § SS 290.2(4).
"z The rule is not applicable to grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974), sentencing procedings, United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971), and evidence that would be excluded from
trial may be used to obtain a warrant, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1959).
Evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment rights, excluded from prosecution of
the case in chief, may be used for impeachment purposes. See Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62, 65 (1954). See also Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975) (fifth amendment).
Only the victim of an unlawful search has standing to invoke the rule. Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973).
See note 65 supra & note 91 infra.
See text accompanying notes 75-81 supra.
564 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1276 (1978).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). But probable cause is not necessary for all arrests.
Id. at 22. Some seizures are considered "reasonable" under the fourth amendment so that a
warrant with its constitutionally required showing of probable cause is not necessary. Id. at
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prove that he had good reason to believe some felonious activity was in
progress.u The officer may arrest or search without a warrant,88 however,
if he has probable cause to believe that a felony was committed by that
particular suspect and there are circumstances compelling his immediate
action. 9 The probable cause standard applies to both warrantless arrests
and arrests with warrants," but the evidence supporting probable cause
need not be admissible in court." Informants supplying evidence of proba-
ble cause must be of demonstrable credibility. Thus, tips from anony-
mous or unreliable informants are not sufficient of themselves to support
probable cause.
The Supreme Court has exhibited a strong preference for warrants"3 and
27; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). The understanding of what seizures are and
are not "reasonable," in the absence of a warrant based on probable cause, is unfolding. See
text accompanying note 11 supra.
s Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). In cases contemporary with the
framing of the Constitution both before, Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby (Conn.) 213 (1787), and
immediately after, Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. (Pa.) 38 (1810); Graumon v. Raymond,
1 Conn. 40 (1814); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841), adoption of the
fourth amendment, courts held common rumor or report or even "strong reason to suspect";
3 Binn. (Pa.) at 43, was not sufficient to support a warrant for arrest or search. C.f. 1 Kirby
(Conn.) at 215. See also 361 U.S. at 101.
Supreme Court interpretation of the probable cause standard has been derived from both
the fourth amendment and its common law antecedents. Ex parte Bollman 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
23 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 638 (1806). The Court has held that evidence
establishing guilt is unnecessary for a showing of probable cause however mere good faith on
the part of the arresting officer is not enough. Probable cause is present when the facts and
circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing than an offense has
been committed. 361 U.S. at 102; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). See also Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-87 (1958); United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 591 (1948); Director
Gen. of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923).
"See notes 6-10 supra.
, This "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement was developed out
of the "mobility exception," first delineated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925);
see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,615 (1961). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 458-64 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). But see United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 594-96 (1974).
" United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1976). "[T]he test is one of federal
law, neither enlarged by what one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by
what another may have colorably suppressed." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224
(1960); accord, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus denied where state
has provided full and fair opportunity to litigate within state); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (federal fourth amendment standards applied to states under the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause).
" See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1949).
, See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1969); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
97 (1964); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964). When the warrant is issued or at the
suppression hearing, the testimony must show why the informant is credible as well as the
basis of his conclusions. 378 U.S. at 114.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965) (search); Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89 (1964) (arrest).
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has enforced rigid standards for their acquisition." There are, however,
several clearly defined exceptions to this warrant requirement,5 including
the "investigative stop" or "stop and frisk" exception. Investigative stops
and protective frisks are seizures and searches under the purview of the
fourth amendment." Although they are lesser intrusions than custodial
arrests or area searches, diminished showings of probable cause suffice to
justify such limited searches and seizures." "Probable cause" 9 is reduced
to "reasonable suspicion"' 1 0 for purposes of these limited intrusions.
"Reasonable suspicion" must be based on specific articulable facts avail-
able to the officer at the time of the stop.'
The Fourth Circuit considered in Gorin whether the tip of an informant
of untested reliability would suppply "reasonable suspicion" adequate to
justify stopping and questioning a suspect. The court held that when a
first-time informant is identifiable, in a position of substantial responsibil-
ity, and provides specific information which is verifiable on the scene, his
information is sufficient to uphold "reasonable suspicion."'
Police received informaton that "a white male, approximately six feet
tall, wearing a black leather jacket and a reddish shirt" was carrying a
concealed weapon. When the policemen arrived at the scene, the suspect
had left, but the bartender of the establishment where the armed man had
been seen confirmed the tip in person. Twenty minutes later and seven
blocks away, detectives enlisted by the policemen saw a man matching the
suspect's description sitting in a car with two other men. One detective
asked to speak with the suspect, defendant Gorin. As the defendant
stepped out of the car, the detective saw the gun, seized it, and arrested
" Warrants must be based on probable cause, as determined by a neutral and detached
magistrate. The burden of proof as to the validity of the warrant is on the government. Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
" See notes 7-10 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 96-101 & 116-120 infra; notes 8 & 84 supra. In Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), the Court focused on the seizure or "stop" half of the "stop
and frisk" exception and upheld the validity of an officer's "investigative stop" to gather
further information about a suspicious individual. Id. at 146-47.
91 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). In Henry, the Court recognized an arrest
as being complete as soon as police officers restricted the movement of defendants. Id. at 103.
See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
" United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); see text accompanying notes
116-120 infra.
" See text accompanying note 38 supra. The common law rule is that an officer making
a warrantless arrest must have reasonable grounds to believe a felony has been committed
by the suspect. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). This "reasonable grounds" test has
been held to be the equivalent of the "probable cause" requirement. Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 310 n.3 (1959).
11 See note 86 supra. Reasonableness of a seizure is determined by balancing the cause
for the search with the degree of intrusion. Something less than probable cause may justify a
seizure if the intrusion is minor. See LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court:
Further Ventures Into the Quagmire, 8 CaiM. L. BULL. 9, 20-24 (1972).
101 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
1- 564 F.2d 159, 161 (4th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. XXXVI
1979] FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Gorin. Further search of Gorin, the car, and the-other occupants uncovered
a second weapon.1 13 Gorin was convicted for unlawful shipment and posses-
sion of firearms.'"
Gorin appealed, claiming evidence used against him at trial was seized
in violation of the Constitution."°5 Because the detective's actions after the
initial stop were allowable," 8 the defendant challenged only the validity of
that incipient seizure."7 The defendant argued that since the informant's
credibility was untested, his information was not sufficiently reliable to
support a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed."' ° The
defendant contended that without reasonable suspicion of felonious activ-
ity, the detective's investigative stop of Gorin was unjustified. Thus, all
evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional seizure should have
been excluded from trial."9
A brief investigative stop of a suspect may be based on a "reasonable
suspicion" that criminal activity is afoot,110 thus the major constitutional
issue that faced the Fourth Circuit was the correct standard of reliability
" Id. at 159-60.
" Id. at 159. Defendant Gorin was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)
(1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1) (1976).
"' 564 F.2d at 160.
" Id. If justification for the initial stop was estabished, the remainder of the chain of
events was unquestionably valid. Id. Gorin's gun was visible to the detective as Gorin stepped
out of the car and thus seizable as evidence in plain view. Id; see note 9 supra. Gorin was
arrested for carrying a concealed weapon, a crime committed in the presence of the arresting
officer. 564 F.2d at 160. A subsequent, more thorough, search of the car and occupants was
allowed under the doctrine of search incident to a lawful arrest. See note 8 supra. Under this
doctrine, officers may make a protective search of the area within the immediate control of
the arrestee. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1969).
The search of Gorin's car was proper under the mobility doctrine of Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Although the
fourth amendment right to be secure in the home has been extended to cars, see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Mimms, 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157, rev'd on other grounds, 434 U.S. 106
(1977), Carroll carves an exception to the warrant requirement when suspects, evidence, or
fruits of a crime are particularly mobile. See note 7 supra. See generally Wales, Probable
Cause to Arrest or Search in Drug Cases, 1 SEmcH mD SEizuRE LAw REP. no. 5 (1974).
The Fourth Circuit encountered a similar problem in United States v. Jefferson, 480 F.2d
1004 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1001 (1973). In that case, a police officer received
information that Jefferson carried a concealed weapon. When Jefferson alighted from his
stopped car, the gun was in plain view. An informant of proven reliability had specifically
identified the suspect by' name. 480 F.2d at 1005.
In analyzing Jefferson, the Fourth Circuit held the stop to be a seizure. The court applied
the Terry reasonableness standard to find that specific information from a reliable informant
sufficed to justify the stop. Id. An important prerequisite to the "plain view" exception to
the fourth amendment warrant requirement is that the officer must be rightfully in a position
to have the view that reveals the evidence. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
In Jefferson, the officer was rightfully in the position from which he saw the gun, validating
the search under the "plain view" doctrine. 480 F.2d at 1006.
"0 564 F.2d at 160.
"' Id.
" See note 72 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 115-117 infra.
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to be applied to information supplied by an informant. The problem of an
informant of untested reliability presented a matter of first impression in
the Fourth Circuit, so the court considered analogous cases in other cir-
cuits."' Under the facts of Gorin, the Fourth Circuit found the bartender's
information specific, credible, and verified by facts on the scene.' The
bartender's position of responsibility bolstered his credibility as an inform-
ant."' The court found that although the information might not have met
"1 564 F.2d at 161. In United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 979 (1973), an anonymous tipster told airport detectives that two men were carrying a
bomb in an orange shopping bag and would board a plane for Chicago at 4:00 p.m. from one
of two airports in the Miami area. Id. at 409. The Fifth Circuit held that police, upon seeing
two men with an orange shopping bag waiting to board a 4:10 plane for Chicago, were justified
in making an investigative stop of the suspects. Id. at 411. See also United States v. Skipwith,
482 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1973) (setting up standards of suspicion for limited weapons
search).
United States v. Hernandez, 486 F.2d 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 959 (1973)
concerned an investigative stop of a van pursuant to a police radio report, based on an
anonymous tip. The tip said people were hiding in the back of the van. Id. at 615-16. The
people turned out to be illegal aliens and the stop was upheld. Id. at 617.
In United States v. Cage, 494 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1974), a police radio bulletin ordered
pickup of an auto whose occupants were reported to have been armed and involved in an
assault. Id. at 741. The Tenth Circuit upheld the stop for investigative purposes only. Id. at
742.
In United States v. Preston, 468 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1972), the police came into a beer
garden and found one man dead on the ground, another brandishing a pistol, and twenty to
thirty more people standing around. A bystander, whose credibility was untested, told police
a nearby car had guns in it. Upon investigation, a shotgun was discovered in plain view. Id.
at 1007-08. The investigation was held valid. Id. at 1010.
United States v. DeVita, 526 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1975) was the only case cited by the Fourth
Circuit as contrary to the Gorin holding. The facts in DeVita, however, are distinguishable.
United States v. Gorin 564 F.2d at 161. A vague tip was given by an informant who had
supplied unreliable information on DeVita previously, touching off a fruitless five-month
surveillance. The court found that no basis existed for stopping suspect's car. Id. at 82-83.
"12 564 F.2d at 160-61. In the case of a warrantless search or seizure, a set of facts that
falls short of probable cause can be corrected by corroboration on the scene. Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1959). In Draper, a proven credible informant told police that
the defendant would be returning from Chicago by train with cocaine, on one of two mornings.
Draper's appearance, clothing, and walking mannerisms were all described. Id. at 309. The
court held that when a person fitting that description got off the train, credibility atached to
the informant's tip and police had probable cause to take the suspect into custody. Id. at 313.
See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416-18 (1969); United States v. Mearns, 443
F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (D. Del. 1978).
Corroboration can correct the deficiency only if credibility of the specific nature of the
information can be clearly inferred from the corroborating facts. See 358 U.S. at 313. The
Supreme Court has allowed corroborating facts to correct a deficient fact situation by showing
surrounding circumstances to be consistent with the specific information given by the inform-
ant in a case where all surrounding specific details given by the informant were corroborated
on the scene. Id.
"1 564 F.2d at 161. When establishing probable cause based on an informant's tip, the
standard is that testimony show the underlying circumstances indicating why the informant
was credible and on what he based his conclusions. Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 93-97 (1964)
(suppression hearings); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-19 (1969) (suppression
hearings); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-16 (1964) (warrant proceeding).
[Vol. XXXVI
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
all the standards of probable cause, it was sufficient to uphold the dimin-
ished standard of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and
would, together with exigent circumstances, justify an investigative stop.",
The Fourth Circuit applied recent Supreme Court cases which have
held that because an investigative stop is a less intrusive seizure than a
custodial arrest,"' less justification is necessary. The decisions provide
guidance on the standards of when and for what cause mildly intrusive
seizures of the person are allowed. According to the Court, investigative
stops are "reasonable" under the Constitution when the public interest in
preventing crime outweighs the individual interest in security from arbi-
trary interference by law officers."' The rule allows investigative stops if,
at the time of the stop, the officer can point to specific articulable facts
that reasonably warrant suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." 7
In recent cases applicable to the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Gorin, the
Supreme Court has clarified the boundaries of the "reasonableness" of an
investigative stop under the fourth amendment"' and .viewed the specific
intrusion of asking a suspect to get out of his car."' After considering the
intrusiveness of requiring that a suspect vacate his automobile to answer
questions, the Court concluded that the possibility of a suspect's shooting
an inquiring officer and the hazard presented by passing traffic combine
to justify the intrusion.' To determine the validity of the intrusion in that
particular situation, the Supreme Court balanced the safety of the officer
with the encroachment upon the suspect's liberty and ruled that if the
intrusion was limited and the danger to the officer was great, then it was
"reasonable" under the fourth amendment to ask the suspect to step out
M 564 F.2d at 161.
M Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975).
" See note 86 supra.
" United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975). The investigative stop, or
"stop and frisk" exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement was set out in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme Court recognized that even a momentary stop of a
suspicious individual is a seizure, and even a light frisk of his outer clothing is a search. Id.
at 16. The intrusion involved, however, is substantially less than that of an area search or a
custodial arrest. Id. at 16-20. The Court found that, under certain circumstances, such lim-
ited intrusions might not be unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment, see
note 100 supra, and that no showing of probable cause would be necessary. 392 U.S. at 26-
27. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in
Terry, holding that proper police conduct may call for a brief investigative stop of a suspicious
individual, despite a lack of probable cause. Id. at 146. The Court designed the investigative
stop exception to the warrant requirement as an intermediate response for situations when
an officer lacks probable cause for arrest but has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot and should examine the situation more closely. The Fourth Circuit relied on Adams
to justify the investigative stop in Gorin. 564 F.2d at 161.
" See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
"J Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). See generally Note, Fourth Amendment
Does Not Prohibit a Police Officer From Ordering a Traffic Offender Out of His Car, 6 AM.
J. CRam. L. 193 (1978).
' 434 U.S. at 110-11.
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of his car. ' The principles set out by Supreme Court cases support the
Fourth Circuit's holding that the detectives had sufficient "reasonable
suspicion" to stop defendant Gorin.
Widespread recognition is afforded the notion that the demands of law
enforcement effectiveness dictate that police be able to make brief investi-
gative stops of suspicious individuals with a minimal amount of cause. The
"reasonable suspicion" standard for upholding an investigative stop ac-
complishes this result. The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Gorin questioned
whether a tip from an informant of apparent though untested reliability
can create a sufficiently reasonable suspicion that a crime is taking place
to make an investigative stop justifiable. The court's holding that such a
tip can justify an investigative stop accords with recent Supreme Court
and circuit court interpretation in the area.
DOUGLAS C. BROEKER
E. Use of Psychiatric Testimony
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all
criminal defendants the privilege against self-incrimination.' There is gen-
eral agreement that this privilege extends to admissions made by defen-
dants to psychiatrists during court ordered psychiatric examinations, al-
though the privilege has been enforced by different means. 2 In the recent
121 Id.
I The federal Constitution provides that "No person . .. shall be compelled in any
Criminal Case to be a witness against himself. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The privilege
against self-incrimination is a personal one, see, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,
233 (1975), and thus cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization. See, e.g., United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (corporations may not assert privilege against self-
incrimination). The self-incrimination privilege is not limited to criminal proceedings, In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967), but may be claimed by a person in any proceeding which legally
requires testimony that might be used against him in that proceeding or in a future criminal
proceeding. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). In 1964, the Supreme
Court applied the Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); see
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The right against self-incrimination only applies to compelled
communicative or assertive testimony, but does not apply to compulsion which makes a
suspect or accused the source of real or physical evidence. 8 J. WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2263-65
(1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMOan].
2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, CmNMAL LAw 310-11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAvE &
ScorT]; see, e.g., United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Julian, 469 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Williams, 456 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d
872 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Driscoll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
The statutory proscription against using admissions made by a defendant during a psychiat-
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case of Gibson v. Zahradnick,3 the Fourth Circuit applied the privilege
against self-incrimination to exclude statements made during a court or-
dered psychiatric examination on the issue of guilt.4 The Gibson court
concluded that the introduction of a defendant's inculpatory statement on
the issue of guilt made during a compulsory psychiatric examination vio-
lates the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. 5
Gibson was arrested for murder." While in the lock-up room at the
courthouse, Gibson disrobed and began speaking incoherently.7 Upon
transfer to the jail, Gibson tore off one of his ears because he believed that
a microphone had been implanted in that ear." Following hospitalization
to re-attach the severed ear, Gibson was transferred to a state mental
hospital to determine whether he was competent to stand trial and whether
he had been sane at the time of the crime.9 During the examination, Gibson
admitted killing his wife and father-in-law to the hospital psychiatrist."
ic examination authorized for the purpose of determining the defendant's competency to
stand trial applies in the federal system. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976); see United States v.
Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968). There is no statutory prohibition, however, against
using a defendant's admission made during a court ordered examination to determine the
sanity of the accused at the time of the criminal act. Nevertheless, many commentators have
suggested that the entire court ordered examination procedure is contrary to the privilege
against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 55 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Aronson]; Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination?
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 RuToGRs L. Rzv. 489 (1965) [herqinafter cited as
Danforth]; Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric
Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HAav. L. REV. 648
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Requiring a Criminal Defendant].
581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Mitchell v. Gibson 99 S. Ct. 597 (1978).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 80.
£ Id. at 77.
7 Id.
'Id.
Id. While Gibson was hospitalized, his appointed counsel obtained a court order to have
Gibson examined by a psychiatrist. However, the psychiatrist at the hospital concluded that
Gibson's mental condition could not be adequately evaluated in the jail and requested that
Gibson be committed to a state mental hospital. The order for the examination by the private
psychiatrist was cancelled and the court issued a new order transferring Gibson to the state
mental hospital. Id. After medication and treatment, Gibson was returned to jail with a
certification that he was competent to stand trial. Id.
Gibson was committed to Central State Hospital pursuant to VA. CODE § 19.2-169 (Supp.
1975) which requires commitment of a person accused of criminal activity when there is
reason to doubt his competency to stand trial. A person is deemed incompetent to stand trial
if, as a reslt of a mental condition, he substantially lacks capacity to understand the proceed-
ings against him or to assist in his own defense. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960). Thus, competency is a determination of the mental condition of the accused at the
time of the trial, whereas the issue of insanity refers to the state of mind of the accused at
the time he committed the act. In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), the Supreme Court
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits conviction of
a legally incompetent person, requires a determination of the competency of an accused to
stand trial when the evidence raises sufficient doubt on that issue. Id. at 377-78, citing Bishop
v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956).
11 581 F.2d at 77.
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At trial, the state presented the hospital psychiatrist solely for the purpose
of introducing the incriminating statements Gibson made during the com-
pulsory psychiatric examination." Gibson was convicted in Virginia state
court for the first degree murder of his estranged wife and for the second
degree murder of his father-in-law.' 2 Gibson's conviction was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Virginia on the grounds that the use of the psychia-
trist's testimony was neither prohibited by statute nor by the privilege
against self-incrimination.' 3
On habeas corpus review,'4 the Fourth Circuit held that the introduc-
tion of the inculpatory statement, made during the compulsory psychiatric
examination, to prove Gibson's guilt, violated Gibson's constitutional priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.'5
The court distinguished between using the results of a compulsory psy-
chiatric examination'6 on the issue of sanity and using incriminating state-
ments obtained during such an examination on the issue of guilt.' 7 The
court concluded that the use of the results on the sanity issue was permiss-
able, but that the use of an incriminating statement on the issue of guilt
" Id. at 77-78. The psychiatrist at the state mental hospital testified that Gibson had
told him that he did not remember anything that happened after the shooting. Id. at 77. The
prosecutor did not ask about Gibson's mental condition while at the mental hospital or at
the time of the slayings. Id. at 77-78.
" Id. at 76.
, Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 219 S.E.2d 845 (1975). The Gibson court
concluded that the psychiatrist's testimony did not violate Gibson's privilege against self-
incrimination because Gibson was not compelled to answer the questions concerning the
offense with which he was charged. Id. at 414, 219 S.E.2d at 847. The court stated that
although there was a physician-patient privilege in civil proceedings, VA. CoDE § 8.01-399
(1977), there was no such provision in criminal proceedings. Thus, the psychiatrist's testi-
mony about the defendant's statements did not violate common law privilege. 216 Va. at 414,
219 S.E.2d at 847. See generally Note, Psychiatrists' Duty to the Public: Protection from
Dangerous Patients, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1103. At common law, there was no doctor-patient
privilege. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2380; Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice
Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L. J.
607, 616-17 (1943). Presently, however, two-thirds of the states recognize a doctor-patient
privilege. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2380. See generally Louisell & Sinclair, Foreward:
Reflections on the Law of Privileged Communications-The Psychotherapist-Patient Privi-
lege in Perspective, 59 CAL. L. REv. 30, 32 n.11 (1971).
" The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Gibson v. Virginia, 425 U.S. 994 (1976), and
the United States district court denied Gibson's petition for habeas corpus.
581 F.2d at 76.
Many states have statutes which authorize court ordered psychiatric examinations.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-102 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5122(c) (1970);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25 (1972); VA. CODE § 19.2-169 (1975). See also Note, Pre-Trial
Mental Examination and Commitment: Some Procedural Problems in the District of
Columbia, 51 GEO. L. J. 143, 145 n.6 (1962).
,' 581 F.2d at 78. The common law rule of limited admissability states that if evidence
is admissable on one issue and inadmissable on another, the court may allow the introduction
of the evidence. FED. R. Evm. 105; C. McCoRMIcK, EVEDENcE § 59 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as McCoRMbcK]. However, the trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence clearly admissa-
ble on one issue if its probative value on that issue is insufficient to outweigh its prejudicial




was constitutionally forbidden.'8 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that both
the state and the defendant need the assistance of expert testimony in a
determination of sanity.'" The court further reasoned that the most de-
pendable and reliable testimony by psychiatrists would be unobtainable
in many cases unless psychiatrists were free to inquire into the prior aber-
rant conduct of a defendant, including his participation in the criminal
activity with which he was charged."0 T enable a psychiatrist to evaluate
fully a person's mental condition at the time of the alleged crime, the
psychiatrist must be free to engage in a penetrating discussion with the
person about his conduct.2 ' Thus, to permit the defendant to remain silent
at the examination by asserting the privilege against self-incrimination
would greatly impede the discovery process relating to the defense of insan-
ity.2 Therefore, the court concluded that the statements made by a defen-
dant at a compulsory examination would violate the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination if admitted on the issue of guilt.2 The court
recognized, however, that in some cases, a psychiatrist testifying on the
issue of sanity will need to disclose statements made to him by 'the defen-
dant concerning the defendant's criminal activity. 2 In cases involving such
a situation, the court stated that the jury must be given prompt and strong
cautionary instructions not to consider such testimony on the issue of the
defendant's guilt.?
The Fourth Circuit rejected the state's contention that Gibson's state-
ment to the psychiatrist was made voluntarily, so as to preclude the appli-
cation of the privilege against self-incrimination.28 The court concluded
that the hospital psychiatrist's statement to Gibson, that he had the right
to remain silent, did not make Gibson's. statement voluntary because his
speech was not a free and willing choice made with appreciation of the
possible adverse consequences.? In concluding that Gibson's statements
1' 581 F.2d at 78; accord, United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1034 n.1 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1042 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Bennett,
460 F.2d 872, 878-80 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Williams, 456 F.2d 217, 218 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Julian, 469 F.2d 371, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bohle,
445 F.2d 54, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1971).
"581 F.2d at 79.
SId.
21 Id.
22 Id.; see Thornton v. Corcoron, 407 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Albright,
388 F.2d 179, 724 (4th Cir. 1968). See generally Aronson, supra note 2; Gallivan, Insanity,
Bifurcation and Due Process: Can Values Survive Doctrine? 13 LAm & WATER L. Rzv. 515
(1978); see also United States v. Mattson, 469 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 986 (1973); United States ex rel. Stukes v. Shovlin, 464 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.
1972); United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1971); Pizzi, Competency to Stand
Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 21, 42-
43 (1977).
581 F.2d at 79.
24 Id.
1 Id.; see text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
2 581 F.2d at 79.
21 Id.; see text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
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were not voluntary, the court reasoned that Gibson was encouraged to
speak freely and was not warned of the consequences which might follow
an admission.3
The court also rejected the state's contention that Gibson waived his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by obtaining the first
order for a psychiatric examination and evaluation.2 9 The Fourth Circuit
held that the exercise of the defendant's right to raise the insanity defense
could not be conditioned upon a waiver of his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination." In rejecting the waiver theory, the court rea-
soned that Gibson's attorney had no choice but to request an examination
in light of Gibson's obvious need for psychiatric examination and treat-
ment2' The court further noted that under the circumstances, the Com-
monwealth's Attorney or the court itself would be required by statute to
order a competency examination,32 whether or not the defense counsel
requested one.
3
The approach adopted by the Gibson court to protect the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination effectuates the underlying values of the
privilege" without impeding the discoveiy process relating to the insanity
defense." Although commentators do not agree on the policy underlying
11 581 F.2d at 79.
29 Id.; note 9 supra.
1 581 F.2d at 80. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The Supreme Court
does not lightly infer the waiver of a constitutional right. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S.
137, 150 (1949). The heavy burden required to demonstrate a valid waiver of a constitutional
right also applies to the states. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Mere cooperation is no longer a sufficient ground for finding a
waiver of a constitutional right. Rather, there must be a knowing, intelligent and voluntary
relinquishment of a defendant's right to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). In a case involving a mentally disturbed offender, the demonstration that his waiver
is knowing, intelligent and voluntary, is even more difficult because his competence to waive
his rights might still be in doubt. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-65 (1938). See generally Danforth, supra note 2, at 498; Fielding,
Compulsory Psychiatric Examination in Civil Commitment and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 9 GONZ. L. REv. 117, 141 (1973).
31 581 F.2d at 80.
Id. Virginia law provides that when there is reason to believe that a defendant lacks
substantial capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense
because of mental disease or defect, the court, the attorney for the Commonwealth, or the
attorney for the accused must request a psychiatric examination. VA. CODE § 19.2-167 (1975);
see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1967).
m 581 F.2d at 80. The court specifically stated its agreement with Collins v. Auger, 428
F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Iowa 1977), which held, as a matter of fundamental fairness required by
the fourteenth amendment, that an incriminating statement made during a psychiatric ex-
amination cannot be used to prove a defendant's guilt. Id. at 1082. The Collins court stated
that any incriminating statement made during the examination could not be introduced at
trial on the issue of guilt, regardless of whether the defendant or the prosecutor requested
the examination, or whether the examination was for the purpose of determining the compe-
tence of the defendant to stand trial or the sanity of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id.
See generally Aronson, supra note 2, at 60; text accompanying note 36 infra.
See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
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the privilege against self-incrimination, 3 the Supreme Court has enunci-
ated basic values which the privilege protects.37 The first value protected
by the privilege is the accusatorial system of criminal justice. 8 The govern-
ment is constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence indepen-
dently and freely secured. 9 The Gibson court's holding forces the govern-
ment to secure independent evidence of the accused's guilt by precluding
the government from using the defendant's statements made during a
compulsory psychiatric examination."0 The second value protected by the
privilege is the preservation of personal privacy from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion." An individual's innermost beliefs and thought pro-
cesses should be unavailable to the state even when he is accused of a
crime."2 In situations such as Gibson's, however, the government must
ascertain what those beliefs and thought processes are in order to prove the
defendant's sanity 3 and not violate the constitutional prohibition against
trying, an incompetent person." Thus, the need of the state to effectively
3 See WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2251, at 296. "There is no agreement as to the policy of
the privilege against self-incrimination. This is partly because there is no 'the' privilege. It is
many things in as many settings." Id. The values underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination are rarely expressed, thus making it necessary to analyze the applicability of
the privilege to a given procedural setting by inquiring whether any or all of the values
intended to be protected would be served by applying the privilege. See generally Aronson,
supra note 2, at 56-58. Wigmore noted twelve possible justifications for the privilege against
self-incrimination. WIOMORE, supra note 1, at § 2251.
* Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
463, 460 (1966); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). See generally
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN.
L. Rav. 671 (1968); Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger
Court's Definition, 61 MIN. L. Rav. 383 (1977).
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 55 (1964); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). See also
Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 RuTGERS L. REV. 541, 545 (1956).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). Under the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, the government has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt.
Although there is nothing on the face of the Constitution that requires the government to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the United States Supreme Court
held, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires the ac'uittal of an accused in a criminal prosecution unless the highest
standard of proof known to the law is satisfied. Id. at 363.
" By compelling the prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt by means of reliable,
independently obtained evidence, the court precludes the prosecution from conducting less
thorough investigations and relying instead on statements obtained from the defendant him-
self. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
Il d.
42 Id.; see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See also WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 2251, at 307; Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 24 U. Cm. L. REV. 472, 487-88 (1957).
4 The defendant always bears the intial burden of going forward with evidence that the
defendant is not sane. See K. WaHoFEN, MENTAL DisoRDER AS A CmnNAL DEFENSE 214 n.1
(1954). See generally _AFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 2, at 306. Once the defendant has met his
burden of going forward with evidence, about half the states and the federal government shift
the burden to the prosecution to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 241-72; Comment, Insanity-The Burden of Proof, 30 LA. L. Rav. 117, 117-18 n.1 (1969).
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determine the sanity of the accused while protecting his privilege against
self-incrimination mandated an alternative procedure to the traditional
one of remaining silent. The court concluded that precluding the use of the
results of the compulsory examination on the issue of guilt was an effective
alternative.4 5 The third value protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination is the right of an individual to be free from undue physical
and mental pressure, both to assure humane treatment and to avoid intro-
duction of unreliable coerced statements.48 Since the presence of coercion
is virtually impossible to determine, specific protective requirements to
assure voluntariness have been instituted as a means of protecting the
accused's privilege against self-incrimination."
To insure the voluntariness of a defendant's statement, the Supreme
Court has held that due process requires every defendant to be informed
of his constitutional rights before custodial interrogation.48 The Gibson
court stated, however, that despite its similarity to custodial interrogation,
informing the defendant of his constitutional rights would not automati-
cally permit the admission of an incriminating statement made during a
compulsory psychiatric examination.49 In reaching that -conclusion, the
Gibson court noted that a defendant is not entitled to the presence of a
lawyer during a compulsory psychiatric examination since the lawyer's
insistence that his client remain silent about the crime would frustrate the
purpose of examination.5 Therefore, the court concluded that merely in-
The Model Penal Code § 4.03(1) characterizes insanity as an affirmative defense which puts
the burden on the prosecution to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence offered
by the defendant on the issue of insanity. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2) (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1961).
11 Due process precludes the trial of an incompetent person. Bishop v. United States, 350
U.S. 961 (1956). The reasons underlying this principle include ensuring the accuracy of the
proceedings, ensuring the fairness of the proceedings, and aiding in maintaining the dignity
of the proceedings. See generally LAFAvE & ScoTt, supra note 2, at 297; Note, Incompetency
To Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REv. 454, 457-58 (1967).
581 F.2d at 80.
" See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966).
" In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a defendant
must be informed that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to counsel, and that if he cannot
afford counsel, an attorney will be appointed to advise him. Id. at 467-79. Only when a
defendant has been informed of his rights and has not been compelled in any way will his
confession be considered voluntary. Id.
Id. at 467.
' 581 F.2d at 79; see Berry, Self-Incrimination and the Compulsory Mental Examina-
tion: A Proposal, 15 Amiz. L. REv. 919 (1973); Note, PreTrial Psychiatric Examinations and
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 232, 237-39.
m 581 F.2d at 79. In Albright, the court considered whether a defendant in a criminal
proceeding had the right to refuse examination by government selected psychiatrists when
the defendant himself proposed to offer evidence of his own insanity. The court concluded
that the government could compel a defendant to submit to such an examination and evalua-
tion for the purpose of obtaining expert testimony on the issue of the defendant's sanity. Id.
at 723. The Albright court also recognized that a federal court has the inherent power to order
a psychiatric examination to assist in the determination of the defendant's mental condition
at the time of the act, id., and held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
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forming the defendant of his rights would not render an incriminating
statement made during a compulsory psychiatric examination admissable
on the issue of guilt since other procedural safeguards instituted to protect




After concluding that the privilege against self-incrimination should be
extended to compulsory psychiatric examinations, the court refused to
recognize a waiver of Gibson's privilege.52 By holding that submission to a
compulsory psychiatric examination was not a waiver, the court avoided
placing Gibson in the position of sacrificing one constitutional right, the
privilege against self-incrimination, for another, the due process right to
seek out available defenses.
The court's determination that prompt and strong cautionary instruc-
tions are sufficient to protect a defendant's privilege is questionable, espe-
cially in cases where psychiatrists, testifying on the issue of sanity, must
necessarily disclose statements made to him by the defendant. The use of
jury instructions to protect a defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination has been criticized on the ground that a jury is unlikely to
adhere to such instructions. 3 A defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination can be better protected b permitting the admission of the
results of a compulsory psychiatric examination on the issue of sanity only
if the sanity issue is decided in a separate hearing following the determina-
tion of guilt. This bifurcated trial procedure has the advantage of insuring
that a defendant's statements cannot operate to his prejudice on the issue
of guilt, but are brought to the attention of the fact finder as a relevant
incrimination bars the use of an incriminating statement made to the psychiatrist during a
psychiatric examination for the purpose of proving the defendant's guilt. Id. at 725. The
Albright court concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination should be given the
same recognition, regardless of whether the psychiatric examination was ordered pursuant
to the court's inherent power to order a psychiatric examination on the issue of insanity or
whether the psychiatric examination was ordered pursuant to statutory authorization. Id.
1, 581 F.2d at 79 n.1. Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court developed the "voluntariness" test for the admission of confessions in state
court. The due process clause requires courts to consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding a confession to determine if a confession was made voluntarily. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961). The
Supreme Court has held that a confession must be the product of an essentially free and
unrestrained choice of the defendant. 412 U.S. 224-25. In determining the voluntariness of a
confession, criteria such as the number of interrogators, the length of questioning, the setting
in which the questioning took place, the age, experience and educational level of the accused,
and his mental capacity are considered. See S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRImiNAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESS: CASES AND MATERALs 984-85 (3d ed. 1975). The Supreme Court has also held that
due process requires that all defendants must be informed of their constitutional rights before
custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966); see note 47 supra.
52 581 F.2d at 79-80; see text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872,
880 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The efficacy of a limiting instruction to protect an individual's privilege
against self-incrimination has been viewed with skepticism. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §
302.17, Comment (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
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